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INTRODUCTION 
This study is an attempt to state the philosophical and idealistic 
basis of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy in regard to Mexico during the 
period from 1913 to 1917- Efforts have been made to choose from his 
various addresses and writings the basic principles behind his Mexican 
policy; to show how these principles were put into practice during this 
period; and to show the influence of the policy not only upon our Mexican 
relations but upon our Latin American relations in general. 
For the period, 1913-1916, I relied greatly upon Ray Stannard Baker 
and William E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson; Selected Literary 
and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow Wilson; and James Brown 
Scott (ed. ), President Wilson's Foreign Policy, a collection of Wilson's 
speeches and writings pertaining to foreign policy. The Lansing Papers, 
Vol. I, and Foreign Relations, 1916, were used extensively during the latter 
part of the study because during this period the policy pursued was in 
the main formulated by Secretary of State Lansing and approved by President 
Wilson. 
General works such as Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of 
the United States; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico; Arthur S. 
Link, Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Era; and James Morton Callahan, 
American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, have extensive accounts of 
Wilson's Mexican policy, but none of them give an exhaustive account of the 
philosophy and idealism behind the policy. The idealism and philosophy 
behind the policy are of extreme importance because they embodied the basic 
principles of Wilson's entire foreign policy. The Mexican upheaval gave 
President Wilson the first opportunity to test the principles which grew 
ii 
out of his dream of a foreign policy based upon morality and one that 
would benefit the masses of the people and not the privileged few. 
The Mexican policy of Wilson was a very important chapter in the 
diplomatic history of the United States. It was a departure from the 
Latin American policies of his predecessors, Theodore Roosevelt and 
William Howard Taft. In his dealings with Mexico, President Wilson at¬ 
tempted to demonstrate his belief that all countries—small ones as well 
as the large ones—should be treated as equals and that the large countries 
should not use their power to exploit and dominate the small countries 
within close geographical proximity to them. The policy of Wilson was 
the beginning of a new era in the United States—Latin American relations. 
Though his policy failed to establish the desired goals in Mexico, it 
laid the basis of the hemispheric solidarity that was to be achieved years 
after his death. 
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CHAPTER I 
FACTORS INFLUENCING WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY 
Wilson's Mexican Policy was the composite of many influences and 
factors. During the period, 1913-1917, the inter-play of these factors 
and influences produced a foreign policy that was a novelty in the 
international relations of the western hemisphere and one which was to 
reach its maturity many years after the death of its originator. 
No phase of Wilson's foreign policy, and particularly his policy 
in Mexico, can be properly understood without some knowledge of his per¬ 
sonality. Above all else, Wilson was fundamentally an idealist or an 
illusionist. One author has described him as "a visionary, a poet, a 
weaver of words, a dreamer of dreams".^ This idealism was a decisive 
factor in Wilson's Mexican policy. Because of this idealism, he en¬ 
visioned a world in which there would be peace based on equality, morality 
and justice. To him and his Secretary of the State, William Jennings 
Bryan, such a world was possible, and both believed that the United States 
should conduct its foreign policy toward this end. 
Besides being an idealist, Wilson was also a moralist who believed 
more in long range principles than in immediate expediences. Idealism 
and morality made Wilson altruistic in his outlook and caused him to 
attempt to project this altruism into his foreign policy. His foreign 
policy, like his done Stic policy, The New Freedom, was based on the premise 
that the welfare of the masses must always supersede the interests of the 




special or privileged classes. Wilson and Bryan wanted to pursue the kind 
of foreign policy which would be beneficial to the masses of the people of 
both the United States and Latin America.^ Dollar diplomacy was rejected 
by Wilson because it resulted in the exploitation of the masses. The up¬ 
heaval and chaos in Mexico gave him his first attempt to make his idealistic 
and altruistic intentions a reality. 
Wilson and Bryan believed that a lasting and enduring peace could be 
achieved if the political leaders of the time would base their international 
relations upon moral principles and not upon the principle of expediency. 
Both of them wanted to pursue a foreign policy which would make the United 
o 
States the supreme moral force in the field of international relations. 
A foreign policy that would "eradicate all selfishness from American foreign 
conduct" was Wilson’s goal because to him this was the only way that the 
3 
United States could hope to fulfill its mission to uplift the world. He 
believed that just as material and self-interest should be subordinated in 
individual conduct, the same standard of self-mastery and altruism should 
be applied to the national conduct of the United States.^ 
Before assuming the presidency, Wilson had observed the inconsistency 
between words and deeds in American foreign policy and had expressed his 
opinion in this connection by saying: 
We have become confirmed...in the habit of acting under 
an old mixture of selfish and altruistic motives...we have 
^Anonymous, "William Jennings Bryan," in Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), The 
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York, 1929), X, 8. 
2Ibid. 
3 
Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interests in American 
Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), p. 176. 
TEbid. 
3 
sympathized with freedom everywhere...have pressed handsome 
principles of equality in international dealings...(But) 
when issues of our own interest arose, we have shown oui*- 
selves kin to all the world, when it came to pushing 
an advantage.^ 
Wilson's policy in Mexico during the period, 1913-1917» was an earnest 
effort to abolish the contradiction stated above. This contradiction be¬ 
tween America's professions and its actions was a hipocrisy that had to be 
eradicated if the United States were to assume the leadership in the move¬ 
ment for a peace based on equality and fair play. 
Wilson's training in political science was not in the area of inter¬ 
national relations. This fact influenced, as well as hampered, the course 
of his policy in Mexico. His inadequacy in international relations was 
expressed early in his first administration when he said to a friend, "It 
would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with 
foreign affairs.It was one of the greatest ironies of history that a 
man trained in theory and domestic affairs would have to tackle some of the 
most trying and complexed foreign relations in the history of the country. 
This lack of training caused President Wilson to venture into paths that 
experienced diplomats would have ridiculed and avoided. His Mexican policy 
was the policy of an idealist and not one of a trained and skilled diplomat. 
A trained and skilled diplomat would have ridiculed the attempt to inject 
morality into the sphere of power politics. 
Popular sovereignty and self-government were to Wilson the political 
reflections of morality, and he believed that it was the duty of the United 
States to make them a reality for all of the world, and particularly for 
^Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (ed.), The Public Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1927), I, liOlu 
2 
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson-Life and Letters (Garden City, 
1927-29), IV, 55. 
k 
the Western Hemisphere.^ Both Wilson and Bryan were theoretically 
dedicated to the ideal of democracy, and both believed that the mission 
of the United States was to spread democracy throughout the world. These 
two idealists desired to spread democracy because they believed that it 
could and would bring happiness to the people of the world, and their 
entire diplomacy was directed toward this end. This type of diplomacy has 
p 
been termed by Arthur S. Link as "missionary diplomacy". The desire to 
spread democracy caused Wilson to interfere in Mexico to the extent that 
war between the two countries was barely avoided. This interference, un¬ 
like that of his predecessor, was not for the aggrandizement of the United 
States or of the financiers of the country. Its sole aim was to impose 
democratic institutions upon a country whose people had not developed to 
the extent to have a great desire for it. In his address before the two 
houses of Congress in joint session on August 27, 1913 Wilson stated that 
the conditions in Mexico offered a great opportunity for enlarging the field 
of self-government provided the situation was handled in the interest of 
the Mexican people and not the Americans with material interests in 
Mexico.3 
Theoretically Wilson believed that every nation, , great or small, had 
the right to determine the character of its institutions and that it had 
the right to run its internal affairs freely without any outside inter¬ 
ference. Tumulty says that Wilson's action in Mexico was based on "the 
firm conviction that all nations, both the weak and the powerful, have the 
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States 
(New York, 19U3), p. 169. 
p 
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York, 
195U) , PP- 81-82. 
3james Brown Scott (ed.), President Wilson's Foreign Policy (New York, 
1918), p. 12. 
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right to control their internal affairs" and "upon the belief established 
from the history of the world that Mexico would never become a peaceful 
and law-abiding neighbour of the United States, until she has been per¬ 
mitted to achieve a permanent and basic settlement of her troubles without 
outside interference."'*' While in many instances Wilson's actions did 
not square with this profession, one must admit that these contradictory 
actions were taken in the interest of self-government for the Mexicans. 
Wilson emphasized the fact that his Mexican policy was based upon his be¬ 
lief that the Virginia Bill of Rights made him believe that the people of 
any country had the right "to do what they damn please with thëir own 
2 
affairs". 
In the course of his Mexican policy Wilson attempted to shape the 
course of Mexican affairs, but he opposed physical intervention because it 
would deny the Mexicans the right to determine their destiny. Intervention 
would be inconsistent with Americans' belief in the Virginia Bill of 
Rights. In this connection Wilson said: 
If we should intervene in Mexico, we should undoubtedly 
revive the greatest suspicions throughout all of the states 
of America. By intervention I mean the use of the power 
of the United States to establish internal order without 
the invitation of Mexico and determine the character and 
method of her political institutions. We have professed 
to believe that every nation, every people, has the right 
to order its own institutions as it will, and we must live 
up to that profession in our actions in absolute good faith.^ 
Another influencing factor of American policy in Mexico during the 
^Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, 1921), 
p. 145.   
^Baker, op. cit., VI, 7U. 
3 
Selected Literary and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow 
Wilson (New York, 1926), II, 214. 
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years 1913 through 1917 was the Pan-American ideal. From the time of 
Simon Bolivar Pan-Americanism had been an ideal, but up to Wilson's 
time it had not been transformed into a reality. The ideal existed in 
the minds of many Americans of both continents of the Western Hemisphere, 
but it had not been realized because of the vast differences between the 
United States and Latin America. These differences resulted from the big¬ 
ness, wealth and power of the United States over against the smallness, 
poverty and weakness of most of the Latin American countries. The United 
States had followed to some degree the tendency of powerful nations to 
dominate the smaller nations within close proximity to them. This tendency 
denied one of the basic principles of Pan-Americanism—the equality of the 
American states. Wilson realized that the success of Pan-Americanism 
rested upon self-restraint and tactfulness on the part of the United States 
and upon its acceptance of the spiritual and legal equality of the Latin 
American states. Wilson saw in the Mexican situation an excellent oppor¬ 
tunity for promoting Pan-Americanism. This idea was expressed by him. 
In an article entitled "The Mexican Problem Again: An Interview" he said: 
In the first place - it is not a question which can be 
treated by itself as only a matter between Mexico and the 
United States. It is a part, a very intimate part, of the 
Pan-American question. The two Americas can be knitted to¬ 
gether only by processes of peace, friendship, helpfulness, 
and good will, and the nation which must of.. .necessity 
take the initiative in proving the possibility of these 
processes is the United States. Ladies Home Journal, 
In October, 1916.1 
Wilson attempted to avoid intervention in Mexico because intervention 
had become synonomous with imperialism, and to him Pan-Americanism did 
2 
not contain in it any spirit of empire. Pan-Americanism, as viewed by 
^Ibid., p. 212. 
p 
Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 1*09» 
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Wilson, called for a changed view of the Monroe Doctrine on the part of 
the United States. The Latin Americans looked upon the Monroe Doctrine 
as being diametrically opposed to the Pan-American ideal. The gulf be¬ 
tween Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine has been clearly expressed 
by Dexter Pericins who said: 
But in one important respect the two conceptions are not 
so much in harmony as in opposition, one to the other. For the 
Pan-American spirit is the spirit of equality and friendly 
understanding; the spirit of Monroeism, as we have seen had 
by 1915 been deeply charged with an assumption of a right of 
control, of superior power of hegemony, over the other states 
of the New World.^ 
Wilson understood that the progress of Pan-Americanism depended upon 
a transformation of the Monroe Doctrine. In order to promote the Pan- 
American ideal he realized that the Monroe Doctrine must be viewed in light 
2 
of Latin American thought. He felt that any discussion of the Mexican 
problem must begin with a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin America 
looked upon the doctrine with suspicion, and this suspicion increased as 
the power of the United States increased. From the beginning Wilson was 
convinced that his course in Mexico must be one that would eradicate Latin 
America’s suspicion of the United States. The eradication of Latin America's 
suspicion would create the confidence needed to make Pan Americanism a 
reality and not merely an abstract theory. This idea was clearly expressed 
when he said: 
The suspicion of our southern neighbors, their uneasiness 
as to our growing power, their jealousy that we should try 
to play Big Brother to them without their invitation to do so, 
has constantly stood in the way of the amicable and happy 
relations we wished to establish with them. Only in very 
■^Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 
19U1), pp. 316-317. 
2 
Selected Literary and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow 
Wilson, I, 212-211;. 
8 
recent years have they extended their hands to us with 
anything like cordiality, and it is not likely that we 
shall ever have their entire confidence until we have 
succeeded in giving them satisfactory and conclusive 
proof of our friendly and unselfish purpose.1 
In furthering his bid for the establishment of proof of the good faith 
of the United States, Wilson emphasized the belief that Latin Americans 
should be given "specific guarantees of some sort, in conduct as well as 
in premise, that we will scrupulously respect their territorial integrity 
and their political sovereignty as we insist that the European nations 
p 
respect them','. Wilson's Mexican policy stemmed from the spirit of Pan- 
Americanism, a spirit of equality, and not from the spirit of imperialism 
and domination. 
Previous to Wilson's administration the Monroe Doctrine had been inter¬ 
preted- as a mandate giving the United States the role of an international 
police in the Western Hemisphere. Such role was based on the premise that 
the United States because of its wealth, strength and power was the dominant 
power in the Western Hemisphere and that because of this, it rightfully had 
the power to correct unsatisfactory conditions in any Latin American country 
in order to forestall any type of European intervention. This idea reached 
its greatest height in the so-called Roosevelt Corallary of the Monroe 
Doctrine and Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy". The policies of Roosevelt and 
Taft had made many Latin American countries "wards, virtual protectorates 
or quasi-pro tec to rates",-3 Latin Americans resented the status assigned to 
’• ' /, • - 
•‘‘Ibid., p. 211*. 
^Ibid. 
3 
Chester Lloyd Jones, et al, The United States and the Caribbean 
(Chicago, 1929), p. 153. " ” 
9 
them by this doctrine and viewed it as one of "the greatest ironies of 
modern history".'*' To them it was ironical that a doctrine inauguarated 
by the United States to forestall European intervention had been used by 
the United States to impose its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.^ 
The role of an international police was rejected by Wilson. In a 
conversation with his friend, Samuel Blythe, he said: 
The function of being a policeman in Mexico has not 
appealed to me nor does it appeal to our people. Our duty 
is higher than that. If we go in there, restore order, and 
immediately get out, and invite a repetition of conflict 
similar to that which is in progress now, we had better remain 
out. 
What we must do and what we hope to do are two fold: First, 
we hope to show the world that our friendship for Mexico is a 
disinterested friendship, so far as our own aggrandizement 
goesj and second, we hope to prove to the world that the 
Monroe Doctrine is not what the rest of the world, including 
some of the countries in this hemisphere, contends—merely an 
excuse for the gaining of territory for ourse Ives. 3 
To Wilson the Mexican Revolution was more than a conflict between 
ambitious men.^ It was a struggle of downtrodden and underprivileged 
masses against an oppressive economic and political system dominated by 
selfish Mexicans and foreign concessionaries. Wilson looked upon the revo¬ 
lution as an attempt to overthrow an old regime based on absolutism in 
government and inequalities in economic and social life. He believed that 
the Mexican Revolution was somewhat similar to the French Revolution aid 
that its success would bring far reaching changes in Mexico just as the 
c 
French Revolution had brought earlier in France. In his renomination 
^Gaston Nerval, An Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 193U)j 
p. 182. 
2Ibid. 
^Scott, op. cit., p. 388. 
^Baker, op. cit., IV, 2hii. 
cj 
-’Scott, op. cit., p. 389. 
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speech he said: 
The people of Mexico are striving for rights that are 
fundamental to life and happiness—fifteen million oppressed 
men, overburden women, and pitiful children in virtual 
bondage in their own home of fertile lands and inexhaustible 
treasures.1 
The Mexican Revolution embraced principles that coincided with Wilson's 
philosophy of political and economic justice. In speaking of Wilson's 
view of the revolution Jose Vasconcelas said: 
In the banner of the Mexican Revolution there was also 
an idealism that could easily meet the Wilsonian creed: a 
democratic form of government, fair treatment for oppressed 
masses, an agrarian reform so badly needed by a country that 
maintains a feudal land system. 2 
Wilson stood firmly on the belief that because of its magnitude the 
Mexican revolution must be given every opportunity to succeed. He felt that 
if the revolution were to succeed, the Mexicans had to be free from outside 
interference of a selfish nature. The Mexicans had the right to attempt 
to free themselves from foreigners whose ideas and interests were different 
from theirs and who "had dictated what their privileges and opportunities 
should be and who should control their lands, their lives, and their re¬ 
sources  some of them Americans, pressing for things they never have got 
in their own country".^ Wilson aimed to pursue a policy which would give 
Mexico the atmosphere that would allow the revolutionary principles to 
become living realities. With this aim in mind he declared his intention of 
doing everything within his power to prevent selfish interests from stand¬ 
ing in the way of the Mexicans' bid for liberation.^ Even though the 
^Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 33î>* 
^J. Fred Rippy, Mexico (Chicago, 1928), p. 120. 
■^Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 28U. 
^Ibid. 
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property of Americans was endangered during the upheaval, Wilson opposed 
interference by the United States because such interference would hinder 
a revolution that was being staged for the emancipation of millions. 
Wilson’s position on interference was expressed when he said: 
We would not act directly in that matter ourselves 
without denying Mexicans the right to any revolution at 
all which disturbed us and making the emancipation of her 
own people await our own interest and convenience. ^ 
The above statement shows in no uncertain terms that to Wilson human rights 
and liberties superseded property rights and materialistic interests. 
The disorders and chaos that resulted from the revolution could not 
force Wilson to intervene for the purpose of establishing order. He viewed 
these chaotic conditions as distressing, but he said that they were "but 
similar to those experienced in other countries where the people have arisen 
p 
against oppression". His historical knowledge made him fully aware of the 
fact that chaos and disorder usually follow the overthrow of the status 
quo, but that when given the opportunity these conditions will give way to 
order and stability. Revolutions in Europe and the American Revolution were 
examples of such a transition. The idea that the Mexican Revolution was 
just and that it should be allowed to run its course regardless of how it 
affected the fortunes of selfish interests—both foreign and domestic— 
dominated Wilson's Mexican policy. 
By nature and temperament Wilson hated war, and his years in the Presi¬ 
dency were spent in the effort to prevent war with its resulting evils 
throughout the world. From experience, as well as from academic training 
1Ibid. 
12 
in history and political science, he developed a fear of war and the devasta¬ 
tions which followed it.'*' Realizing that the Mexicans would oppose with 
arms any outside attempt to suppress the revolution, he vigorously opposed 
the demands of those who clamored for United States intervention. In a 
conversation with Tumulty he expressed the fear that intervention would 
o 
result in war. War to Wilson, was immoral and should become extinct and 
obsolete in men's relations with each other. Throughout the years, 1913- 
1917, he made every reasonable effort to avoid war and to prove that 
nations, like individuals, could settle their disputes without fighting. 
The Mexican Revolution occurred during a period when the world was 
witnessing World War I, its greatest catastrophe up to that time. The war 
in Europe had a great effect upon Wilson's policy in Mexico. Conditions 
in Europe gave him the opportunity to pursue his course free from European 
pressures and possible attempts of interference. The European powers, 
while engaged in the struggle for survival, could not press the United States 
into taking positive action in order to avoid European intervention. Under 
such conditions Wilson was free to experiment with his idealistic prin¬ 
ciples. 
The war in Europe influenced Wilson's policy in another way also. As 
the war progressed, it became evident that the United States would become 
engulfed in it. Faced with this reality, the United States could not become 
involved in war with Mexico because the troops and supplies that would have 
to be used in such a war could not be afforded. When relations with Mexico 
reached their lowest ebb and when Wilson might have considered intervention 
^As a child he had witnessed the devastating and demoralizing condi¬ 
tions which followed the Civil War. 
2 
Tumulty, op. cit., p. 158. 
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and possibly war, he was guided by the conclusion that conditions in Mexi¬ 
co, bad as they seemed, must be tolerated as long as there was a possi¬ 
bility that American troops would go to Europe. 
CHAPTER II 
WATCHFUL WAITING 
The Mexican problem was not one of Wilson's making, but was an inheri¬ 
tance from the Taft administration. During Taft's administration the 
opposition to the Diaz regime in Mexico culminated in a revolution that 
resulted in the overthrow of the autocrat, Diaz, and the establishment of 
a provisional government led by Francisco Madero, an impassioned theorist 
of noble birth, but who was fighting for democratic principles and justice 
for the underprivileged masses.^ In October, 1911 Madero was elected 
President by an overwhelming majority. 
The vested interests in Mexico — the landholding class, the politicians, 
the business interests, the Catholic Church and the army — opposed the 
revolutionary changes that were taking place and resisted the movement that 
was designed to deprive them of their privilege of exploiting the under- 
priveleged and impoverished majority of the Mexicans. This opposition en¬ 
couraged ambitious aspirants for political power and gain to engage in open 
opposition to the administration. Such opposition bred disorder, lawless¬ 
ness and confusion, and these in tern provided the atmosphere for a contest 
among selfish and ambitious men for power and wealth. Madero's inability 
to cope with these conditions, together with a desire for power and personal 
gain, caused General Victoriano Huerta, the commander of the government 
forces, to desert the administration and to stage a coup d'etat. Huerta then 
ordered the arrest of Madero and Fice-President Suarez. Within a few days 
^Graham Stuart, Latin America and the United States (New York, 19U3), 
p. 152. 
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after the coup d'etat, former President Madero and Vice-President Suarez 
were murdered on the way from the National Palace to the penitentiary. 
Even though Huerta denied responsibility for the murders, strong opposition 
I 
developed against him particularly in Sonora and Coahiula.^ Further dis¬ 
order and reprisals occurred as Huerta tried to save his government from 
the opposition which declared itself opposed to government established 
upon criminal and treasonable acts. 
During the period from the overthrow of Diaz to the death of Madero, 
many American lives had been lost and much American property had been de- 
p 
stroyed. Because of Madero's inability to protect American6' life and 
property the Taft administration sent a warning to the Mexican government 
that Americans must be given adequate protection.^ Chaotic conditions in 
Mexico made it necessary for extra American troops to be stationed along 
the borders in case intervention became necessary. Taft's policy in re¬ 
gard to Mexico was based on the principle of non-intervention.^ From his 
experience in the Philippines, Taft knew that intervention in a country 
for the purpose of establishing peace would be resented by the inhabitants 
of that country and would result in the loss of many American lives and 
the spending of many American dollars.-’ Taft did not accept the Roosevelt 
Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine and because of the rejection of this idea 
he and Secretary Knox avoided any action that might have been interpreted 
as intervention in Mexico's domestic affairs. 
1Ibid., p. 153. 
2 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New 
York, 191*5), p. 603. 
%enry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, II, (New 
York, 1939), 701-711. 
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, 
(New York, 1953), p. 171. 
^Ibid. 
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Henry Lane Wilson, the American Ambassador to Mexico and an ardent 
champion of vested interests there, constantly and persistently argued 
for the recognition of Huerta*s de facto government because to him this 
was the only way to bring the ciiaotic and unstable conditions in Mexico to 
an end. Wilson, on the other hand, believed that without the recognition of 
the United States, Huerta would not have the prestige necessary to establish 
order and to gain respect for his de facto government. In a reply of Febru¬ 
ary 13, 1913 Knox informed Ambassador Wilson that before the United States 
could extend recognition to the Huerta government that government must 
prove that it was both willing and able to comply with existing rules of 
international law and amity, treaty obligations and the general duties to 
foreigners and foreign counties.'*' Knox further informed Ambassador Wilson 
that in addition to meeting the legal obligations Mexico must be willing 
to arrange for the settlement of the Tlahualilo controversy, the Chamizal 
dispute, the controversy over an equitable distribution of the waters of 
Colorado, claims resulting from the recent disorders in Mexico and the matter 
9 
of improvement of justice in Mexican courts. Three days after Madero's 
murder Wilson wired Knox that Huerta had verbally expressed his willingness 
3 
to comply with the conditions proposed by the Taft Administration. Wil¬ 
son's wire did not secure for Huerta the recognition that he was seeking. 
On February 26 Knox wired Ambassador Wilson and instructed him not to extend 
any formal recognition to Huerta, but to transact business informally with 
^James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations 





him.1 Informal transaction of business was a practice that was customary 
during the time previous to the granting of formal recognition. 
Taft's hesitancy to grant recognition was not motivated by any idealis¬ 
tic or moral principles. Being a jurist and a practical man he was con- 
2 
ceraed only with the legal and national aspects involved in recognition. 
In fact, there is no evidence that Taft even looked upon the Mexican situ¬ 
ation in terms of Pan-Americanism.-^ The requirements that were demanded 
of Huerta were the same that would have been required of any other govern¬ 
ment seeking recognition. The question of the moral right of the Huerta 
government did not play the part in Taft's refusal to grant recognition 
as it was to play in Wilson's refusal. The Taft Administration saw in the 
request for recognition an opportunity to advance the national policy of 
the United States by making recognition contingent upon the favorable 
settlement of questions that were of significance to the United States. 
While waiting for concrete evidence of Huerta's ability to fulfill the 
legal requirements of recognition, a development in Mexico delayed Taft's 
decision on the recognition of the de facto government of Huerta. On 
February 26, Taft received a wire from Venustiano Carranza , Governor of 
Coahuila, requesting the United States to deny Huerta recognition because 
his coup d'etat had destroyed constitutional government in Mexico.^ The 
wire implied open revolt against Huerta. Realizing that the impending 
revolt might result in Huerta's overthrow, Taft decided to watch and let 
^Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 737-738. 
2 
J. Fred Rippy, United States and Mexico (New York, 1931), pp. UO-i|l. 
^Ibid. 
Callahan, op. cit., p. 537* 
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events in Mexico decide the fate of the Huerta government before he de¬ 
cided for or against recognition. At this stage recognition of the de 
facto government by the United States would have given Huerta an advantage 
which would have made it possible for him to stabilize his position in 
Mexico. Since his administration was just about to end, Taft could easily 
escape the possible blame of helping to saddle Mexico with a villainous 
ruler by passing the question of recognition on to his successor, Woodrow 
Wilson. Along with the question of recognition Taft passed also to Wilson 
the policy of "watchful waiting" which was to characterize Wilson's policy 
in Mexico during the years, 1913-1917. 
President Wilson entered office well acquainted with the Mexican 
situation. After Wilson's election Secretary Knox instructed the Assistant 
Secretary of State to keep him informed on the status of Mexican affairs. 
Letters from interventionists and reports from Ambassador Wilson along with 
comments from experts in the State Department were placed at his disposal.^ 
Information acquired from these sources gave him a good insight into the 
Mexican situation. The first utterance which implied that he would not 
recognize Huerta was made in his "Declaration of Policy with Regard to 
Latin America" on March 11, 1913. In this declaration he said that the 
chief objective of his Latin American policy would be the development of 
cordial understanding and cooperation between the United States and Latin 
America. The declaration went on to say: 
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn 
by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not 
upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all 
^Baker, op. cit., IV, p. 238. 
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thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, 
that just government rests always upon the consent of the 
governed, and that there can be no freedom without order 
based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. 
We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual 
intercourse, respect and helpfulness between our sister 
republics and ourselves. We shall lend our influence or 
every kind to the realization of these principles in fact 
and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigues and 
defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit 
government and injure none so much as the people who are 
unfortunate enough to have their common life and their 
common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We have no sym¬ 
pathy with those who seek to seize the power of government 
to advance their personal interests and ambitions. We are 
friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting 
or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends therefore, 
we prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who 
protect property rights, and respect the restraints of con¬ 
stitutional provision. Mutual respect seems to us the indis- 
pensible foundation of friendship between states as between 
individuals. 1 
The above statement of policy expressed Wilson's dislike and opposition 
to government brought into existence by the intrigues of greedy and ambitious 
sen who overthrew constitutional processes and established these governments 
against the wishes of the people. Although he did not mention Mexico or 
the Huerta government, it was clear that he would not recognize the de facto 
government because it had been created by the method which he had condemned 
in this declaration and because of this it could not meet the Wilsonian 
requirements for friendship and ultimate recognition. In this declaration 
he intimated that constitutional government was a requirement for recogni¬ 
tion by the United States. His insistence upon orderly government was not 
a new departure in the recognition policy of the United States, but his 
2 
insistence upon constitutional government was. This requirement established 
^Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 7« 
2 
John Lasalle McMahon, Recent Changes in the Recognition Policy of 
the United States (Washington, 1933), p. 55» 
j 
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the principle that recognition depended upon the character of the govern¬ 
ment. 
Wilson's insistence upon constitutional government was tied up with 
his love for peac*. Constitutional governments provided for orderly 
and peaceful changes, whereas, governments established by arbitrary force 
contained the seeds of discord and rebellion. Governments established 
by force were uncertain and were a threat to the general peace because 
as soon as the opposition forces gathered enough strength to attack, civil 
war was likely to occur. 
Constitutional governments in Mexico and the rest of the Latin American 
would do much to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere. Disorder¬ 
ly conditions and civil wars made it impossible for the Latin American 
countries to perform their obligations. The inability to perform these 
obligations was an invitation to the European powers to threaten or to 
actually carry out the threat of intervention in order to force the ful¬ 
fillment of them. Constitutional government would give the stability 
necessary for producing strong government which would be able to meet 
their international obligations. Strong governments able to meet their 
international obligations to countries and to individuals would remove the 
cause for European intervention. Here Wilson was attempting to establish 
order and stability through the establishment of constitutional government, 
whereas Theodore Roosevelt and Taft had attempted the same objective 
through intervention and dollar diplomacy respectively. 
Wilson, though determined to bring about Huerta's downfall, did not 
at first attempt to make any radical change in the policy which had been 
begun by Taft. At first he followed a negative policy as the term "watchful 
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waiting” implied, and waited to let events in Mexico work themselves out. 
When the situation became more complicated and it appeared that Huerta 
would not be overthrown as quickly as Wilson had anticipated, the Presi¬ 
dent changed his policy from one of negation to one of positive action. 
After this change the policy could no longer be properly termed "watchful 
waiting". "Watchful waiting" implied hands off and to let conditions work 
themselves out without any direct or indirect interference from the outside. 
Wilson’s so-called "watchful waiting" resulted in indirect intervention for 
the purpose of transforming the Mexican struggle from a mere struggle to 
dispose a tyrant into a victory for constitutional government. His refusal 
to recognize Huerta was really an attempt to impose the American way of 
1 
orderly elections and popular choice upon Mexico. 
When Wilson entered the Presidency, he had definitely decided that he 
would not recognize the de facto government of Huerta because he believed 
that recognition would waste the hard won fight of the Mexican masses 
2 
against the arbitrary rule of the favored few. To him Huerta was a tyrant 
who had taken a movement designed for the emancipation of the downtrodden 
people of Mexico and had turned it into an opportunity for personal advance¬ 
ment. In refusing to extend recognition he was trying to establish a new 
principle in Pan-American affairs, namely that "no president of a South 
American republic who came to power by usurpation and assassination should 
3 
receive while he was president the recognition of the United States". In 
speaking of this doctrine Tumulty said that it was good statesmanship and 
^Morton Gordon (ed.), Theory and Practice of American Foreign Policy 
(New York, 1955), p. 57. 
2 
Tumulty, op. cit., p. lUU. 
3Ibid., p. 1^7 
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sound in morals. 
Making morality a basis for recognition was a new departure in the 
recognition policy of the United States. From the days of Jefferson the 
policy of the United States had been to quickly recognize revolutionary 
governments just as soon as they had shown that they had de facto control 
and declared their willingness to fulfill the international obligations 
required of recognized governments. The means by which the revolutionary 
governments had acquired their power had not been a determining factor until 
Wilson's administration. Before Wilson's time no attempt had been made to 
determine the legitamacy of the governments. The presidents from Jefferson 
to Taft had followed the view of the other leading countries in regard to 
recognition. This view was that: 
Recognition of a new Head or Government by no means implies 
the recognition of such Head or Government as the legitimate 
Head or Government. Recognition is, in fact, nothing else 
than the declaration of other States that they are ready to deal 
with a certain individual or group of individuals, as the highest 
organ of a particular State, without prejudice to the question 
whether such individual or group of individuals ought, or ought 
not, to be considered to be the legitimate Head or Government of 
that State...2 
Wilson refused to accept this view because its acceptance would saddle 
Mexico with a tyrant and would delay the growth and development of consti¬ 
tutional government. According to Wilson, Mexico had a gresfc future, but only 
if it followed the path of "honest constitutional government".^ The rejec¬ 
tion of an immoral and an illegimate government was necessary to give Mexico 
the right to achieve its great future. 
1Ibid. 
^Herbert W. Briggs (ed.), The Law of Nations (New York, 19U6), p. 66. 
-'Scott, op, cit., p. 3* 
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During the early days of Wilson's administration conditions in Mexico 
became worse. While it was impossible to estimate the strength of the 
Constitutionalists, it was apparent that Huerta did not have the control 
over the country that he claimed.^ In an effort to ascertain the true 
conditions Wilson sent his trusted friend, William Bayard Hale, on a secret 
mission to Mexico. Hale, in his dispatches to Wilson, stated that in light 
of the conditions in Mexico, Huerta's government could not survive and that 
the establishment of a constitutional government would be the only thing 
2 
that could avert intervention of the United States. 
Before the Hale mission Wilson had declared himself in favor of con¬ 
stitutional government in Mexico, but he had not taken any specific steps 
to bring it into being. Until June, 1913 he had not made any offer of help 
or any suggestions to the Mexican government. He had declared only that he 
would not recognize Huerta. Acting on the information received from Hale, 
Wilson on June lU, 1913 informed Huerta that if he assured the United States 
that he would hold an early and free election and that he would not be a 
candidate, the United States would attempt to bring about a settlement be- 
tween the warring factions in Mexico. Following the offer of June lit, 
Wilson dismissed Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson because of his sympathy for 
Huerta, and sent Bryan's close friend, John Lind, former Governor of 
Minnesota, to Mexico City with instructions to push his proposal of June ll*. 
Wilson instructed Lind to state the purpose of his mission in the following 
words: 
The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the 
fulfillment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, 
^"Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 110. 
^Ibid., p. 112. 
^Ibid., p. 113. 
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and with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and 
with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic 
conditions in Central America. It is upon no common 
occasion therefore, that the United States offers her 
counsel and assistance.^- 
The proposal as presented by Lind embodied the following conditions: 
(1) immediate cessation of hostilities in Mexico; (2) an early and free 
election in which all parties would participate; (3) elimination of Huerta 
as a candidate; and (U) the acceptance of the election results by all 
2 
parties together with their cooperation in supporting the new government. 
Huerta informed Nelson 0'Shanghnessy, American Charge d' Affaires, that 
Lind would not be accepted unless he came to Mexico as an accredited agent. 
Lind was sent but not as an accredited agent. To have sent him as an 
accredited agent would have implied recognition of Huerta — a thing that 
Wilson did not wish to do under any circumstances. 
Although Lind was courteously received, his mission was doomed from 
the very beginning because of Huerta's hostility to the proposals he made. 
On August 16 Lind received from Federico Gamboa, Mexican Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, a dignified note rejecting the proposals. On August 25 
Lind delivered a second note containing practically the same proposals as 
the first one. In an effort to secure Mexican support the second note 
emphasized the point that the United States, while seeking to counsel Mexico, 
had no intent to violate Mexico's sovereignty. Gamboa replied by stating 
that his government could not accept any proposal which would imply that the 
President of the United States had the right to determine Mexico's affairs.^ 
^Scott, op. cit., p. 5» 
^Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 821-822. 
3Ibid., pp. 832-835. 
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After his proposals had been rejected by Huerta, Wilson went before 
a joint session of Congress on August 27 to brief it on the state of con¬ 
ditions in Mexico. He explained why Lind had been sent to Mexico, and he 
expressed the belief that the Mexicans had rejected the proposals because 
they misunderstood the movtive behind them. He told Congress that: 
So long as the misunderstanding continues we can only 
await the time of their awakening to a realization of the 
actual facts. We cannot thrust our good offices upon them. 
The situation must be given a little more time to work it¬ 
self out in the new circumstances; and I believe that only a 
little time will be necessary.1 
In the course of the same speech he said that while waiting for the 
Mexican situation to work itself out, the United States would keep "Hands 
off" and would trust that the pressure of moral force would cause the Mexican 
factions to accept the proposal of the United States as a fair and just 
2 
solution to their problems. In expressing this position he said: 
It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will 
do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in 
order again and wait for further opportunity to offer our 
friendly counsels.3 
From August 27 through October it can be said that Wilson followed 
what might be called a "hands off" policy. On October 10, Huerta further 
showed his contempt of constitutional government by seizing control of 
the Chamber of Deputies, which was largely composed of Madero's followers, 
arresting one hundred and ten members and establishing a full fleged dic¬ 
tatorship. This tyrannical act made Wilson more indignant and caised him 
to abandon the "hands off" policy by formulating a more direct policy 
^Scott, op. cit., p. 7. 
^Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 820-823. 
3 
Scott, op. cit., p. 29. 
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for the ultimate elimination of Huerta. On November 21* in a report to 
the various embassies and to John Lind, who was still in Mexico, the 
President announced his new policy in the following words: 
Usurpations like that of General Huerta menace the peace 
and development of America as nothing else could. They not 
only render the development of orderly self-government im¬ 
possible j they also tend to set law entirely aside, to put 
the lives and fortunes of citizens and foreigners alike in 
constant jeopardy, to invalidate contracts and concessions 
in any way the usurper may devise for his own profit and 
all the foundations of business, domestic or foreign. It 
is the purpose of the United States therefore to discredit 
and defeat such usurpations wherever they occur. The pre¬ 
sent policy...is to isolate General Huerta entirely$ to cut 
him off from foreign sympathy and aid and from domestic 
credit, whether moral or material, and to force him out. 
It hopes and believes that isolation will accomplish this 
end and shall await the results without irritation or 
impatience. If General Huerta does not retire by force 
of circumstances it will become the duty of the United 
States to use less peaceful means to put him out.l 
The above policy was one of indirect intervention which could and 
did prove itself to be just as effective as physical intervention. Foreign 
sympathy and credit were essential to Huerta's success, and if Wilson's 
policy succeeded in depriving him of these, his abdication was inevitable. 
This policy implied the threat of armed intervention if peaceful measures 
did not bring about the desired results in Mexico. 
In announcing the new policy Wilson took great pains to make it clear 
that the United States was not seeking any aggrandizement for itself. The 
unselfish purpose of the United States was expressed when he said: 
Beyond this fixed purpose the Government of the United 
States will not go. It will not permit itself to seek any 
special or exclusive advantages in Mexico or elsewhere, for 
its own citizens but will seek, here as elsewhere, to show 
itself the consistent champion of the open door.^ 
^Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 856. 
^lbid. 
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This was a bid for the support of European countries for his policy. 
By declaring the United States "the champion of the open door" Wilson 
was making it plain that Mexico was not to become a sphere of influence 
of the United States. 
Fortunately for Wilson European discords made it possible for him to 
pursue this policy free from diplomatic pressure from the European powers. 
* •' ' ' t • A. 
If conditions in Europe had not been as strained as they were, European 
powers would have threatened intervention for the purpose of protecting 
the lives and property of their nationals, and this would have forced 
Wilson into taking a firmer hand in order to bring the Mexican crisis to 
a peaceful settlement. With conditions as they were in Europe, the covin- 
tries there could ill afford to press for action because they realized 
that an European crisis was inevitable and that it would demand all of 
their energies and resources. Germany announced its intentions to do 
nothing in Mexico that would displease Wilson, and France declared that it 
would follow the lead of the United States there.^ 
Great Britain's position at first was not too clear. British dependence 
on Mexican oil caused the British oil interests with concessions in Mexico 
to exert much influence on British policy in Mexico. Disorders in Mexico 
not only threatened the vested interests of Great Britain, but they also 
threatened a source of oil supply for the British navy. Believing that 
the recognition of Huerta would bring order to Mexico and thereby assure the 
British a source of oil, the British government recognized the de facto 
government in Mexico provisionally. President Wilson believed that the 
British Foreign Office was backing up the British oil interest and that 
at ion, January 22, I9II4., p. 73 
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the provisional recognition, of Huerta meant that the British would fight 
his non-recognition policy.'*' Wilson's famous Mobile Address, "A New 
Latin American Policy" in which he repudiated dollar diplomacy by calling 
for the emancipation of Latin America from the control of foreign con¬ 
cessionaries was really a rebuke to the British Foreign Office. Link 
says that, "If one reads 'Mexico' for Latin America' and 'Great Britain' 
for 'foreign interests', the subtle meaning of Wilson's words become 
evident".^ 
The British Foreign Office realized that in the event of an European 
crisis, American friendship would be more valuable than Mexican oil. This 
fact, together with Wilson's promise to urge Congress to repeal the Panama 
tolls act which discriminated against the British ships using the Panama 
Canal, caused Great Britain to instruct its Ambassador to Mexico not to 
take any steps which might in any way interfere with Wilson's anti-Huerta 
policy of non-recognition.-^ Great Britain later cleared the way for Wilson 
by withdrawing its provisional recognition of Huerta. In evaluating the 
importance of the British withdrawal Charles Seymour said: 
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the abdication 
and flight of Huerta, in July, 191U, was directly related 
to the withdrawal of British support. Huerta's elimination 
was the first and perhaps the only diplomatic triumph won 
by Wilson in his Mexican policy, and it is right that future 
historians should understand that something of it was due 
to British cooperation.^ 
"'"Charles Seymour (ed. ), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York, 
1926-28), I, 19U.    
2 
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 118. 
■^Seymour, op. cit., I, 198-202. 
> » P* 202. 
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After diplomatic isolation failed to bring about Huerta’s downfall 
as fast as Wilson desired, he then made good his threat of November 2U 
to use less peaceful means. Until February 3, 191ii he had followed a 
policy of strict neutrality in the Mexican civil war by rigidly enforcing 
the law of March Hi, 1912 which gave the President the power to prevent any 
of the contending factions from receiving arms and munitions from the 
United States. On February 3, Wilson abandoned the policy of strict neu¬ 
trality by removing the embargo on arms to Huerta's opponents in Mexico. 
The removal was for the purpose of bringing Huerta!'s downfall through the 
prolongation of the civil war in Mexico. Recognition of Huerta by some 
of the European countries had made it possible for him to buy arms and 
munitions from these countries. Now with the other factions being able to 
secure arms and minitions from the United States, they would have a better 
chance of overthrowing Huerta. In a statement concerning the removal of the 
arms embargo Bryan said: 
By removing the inhibition of the exportation of arms and 
ammunitions into Mexico the Government of the United States 
puts itself, and intends to put itself, in the same position 
as other nations whose citizens have all along been at 
liberty to sell what they please to Mexico. The Government 
of the United States deems it essential to the settlement 
of her present difficulties that Mexico should be treated 
as any other country would be which was tom by civil war.-*- 
The removal of the arms embargo was contradictory to the policy of 
"watchful waiting" because it was an attempt to hasten conditions to a 
desired end rather than to let them work themselves out as they may. Re- 
moving the embargo was not only contradictory to "watchful waiting" but 
was contradictory to Wilson's love for peace and hatred for war because it 
Foreign Relations, 191U, p. Ui7. 
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meant war on a larger scale than before. However, the President and 
Bryan, both of whom were pacifists, felt that the endsought justified the 
means used. In a sense this was a victory of power politics over idealism. 
Wilson's actions caused Huerta to assume a hostile and contemptible 
- ■" - - ■ • 
; 
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attitude towards the United States. Huerta sneered at watchful waiting 
and laughed at the high idealism upon which it was based.1 Realizing 
that President Wilson had made his position insecure made Huerta desirous 
of embarrassing the American President by showing further contempt of him. 
An incident of April 10 gave him his opportunity. On this date the pay¬ 
master and crew of the U. S. S. Dolphin were arrested in Tampico when they 
landed their whaleboat behind the federal lines without permission. At 
this time Tampico was held by the Huerta forces, but it was being attacked 
by the Constitutionalist array. General Zoragoza, commander of Huerta's 
forces, immediately release the Americans and sent a subordinate officer 
to Admiral Mayo to express his regrets for the arrest. Zoragoza claimed 
that Colonel Hinojosa, the arresting officer, had made the arrests through 
ignorance of the law and was only attempting to carry out his instructions 
not to allow any boat whatsoever at the warehouse dock. ^ If Mayo had 
accepted this apology and allowed the incident to be closed, President Wilson 
would have been spared much criticism and many embarrasing moments. How¬ 
ever, the refusal to accept the apology led to a string of incidents which 
ultimately resulted in Huerta's downfall. Instead of accepting the apology 
Mayo sent to Zoragoxa the following ultimatums 
In view of the publicity of this occurrence, I must 
require that you send me, by suitable members of your staff, 
formal disavowal of your apology for the act, together with 
Tumulty, op. cit., pp. 11*5-11*6. 
^Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill, 191*6), p. 197. 
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your assurance that the officer responsible for it shall 
receive severe punishment. Also that you publicly hoist 
the American flag in a prominent position on the shore 
and your salute will be duly returned by this ship. Tour 
answer to this communication should reach me and the called 
far salute be fired within twenty-four hours from 6 P.M. of 
this date.l 
The ultimatum was sent without the advice of the President or the 
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. Mayo assumed a responsibility which 
placed the country in a precarious position and one that could have possibly 
ruined Wilson's "watchful waiting". When informed of Mayo's ultimatum, 
President Wilson said, "I have known for months that some such thing could 
O 
happen - it was inevitable, in fact". This anticipated fear on Wilson's 
part probably accounted for the presence of American ships in Mexico before 
and at the time of the Tampico incident • 
The State and Navy departments, with the exception of Daniels, agreed 
with Admiral Mayo's refusal to accept the apology. Although Daniels opposed 
Mayo's taking the initiative when it was possible for him to have wired 
Washington for instructions, he felt, in this respect like the rest of the 
cabinet, that President Wilson could not let the Admiral down. Wilson 
frowned upon the ultimatum at first because it knew that it could result in 
a very embarrassing situation. Further unfriendly acts by Mexico caused 
Wilson to change his attitude and convinced him that his only course was to 
back Msyo. Wilson felt that a refusal would strengthen Huerta and weaken 
the American position.^ Secretary Bryan and the rest cf the cabinet fully 
agreed with this position. 
After deciding to back Mayo's ultimatum, the President tried to make it 
foreign Relations, 1911i, pp. l*U8-l|]r9. 
2 
Daniels, op. cit., p. 188. 
%bid., p. 191. 
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clear that whatever action that was taken would be directed against Huerta 
and not the Mexican people and that it was taken as a punitive measure 
against a person and not a country. Wilson informed the news correspondents 
who beseiged him for an answer on the issue that it was "an issue between 
this government and a person calling himself the Provisional President of 
Mexico, whose right to call himself such we never have recognized in any 
way" He went on to explain to the correspondents that it was possible to 
2 use naval action against a dictator without precipating war. Here the 
President was expressing a principle that he was to use later in dealing with 
the European powers — the principle that a quarrel or war against a leader 
was not always a quarrel or war with a nation. He hoped that this principle 
would cause the removal of a leader by isolating his own people from him. 
In a telegram of April 10, Secretary Bryan instructed the American 
charge in Mexico City, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, to present immediately the mat¬ 
ter of the ultimatum to the Mexican foreign office "with utmost firmness, 
earnestness, and frankness, representing to them the extreme seriousness of 
the situation and the possibility that the gravest consequeue es may ensue 
unless the guilty parties are promptly punished".^ In the meantime O'Shaughn¬ 
essy called upon Huerta and reminded him of the gravity of the situation. 
Huerta gave him a written statement tfiich expressed the following points: 
(l) that in view of the fact that it was claimed that the whale-boat was 
flying the American flag an investigation to determine Colonel Hirajosa's 
responsibility would be madej (2) that Mexico regretted what had developed 
from a misunderstanding by a subordinate officer as had been pointed out by 
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General Zoragoza; (3) that General Zoragoza had punished Colonel Hirajosa 
to the extent of his authority; and, (U) that if further investigation 
proved a greater responsibility on Colonel Hirajosa's part competent authori¬ 
ties would impose the appropriate penalties on him.^ Huerta's reply did not 
satisfy the Wilson administration because it had become determined that 
Huerta should apologize in the manner prescribed by it, namely by saluting 
the flag. After the desired apology did not come as the administration had 
hoped, Bryan instructed O'Shaughnessy to press far a prompt acceptance of 
the ultimatum and to make it known that the failure to accept "might lead 
to a situation which this Government and I am sure, General Huerta himself 
p 
would contemplate with the greatest reluctance". 
After two conferences with Huerta, O'Shaughnessy informed Bryan that 
Huerta said that General Zoragoza's expression of regret should have been 
accepted without further demands by the United States especially since it was 
dealing with a nation weaker than itself and tfiich was also torn by revolu¬ 
tion. Huerta further declared1 that since the United States did not recog¬ 
nize him, it could not rightfully demand a salute from him, and that even 
if it did, he was not obligated to give it. Huerta told O'Shaughnessy that 
the dispute was a question for the Hague Tribunal, a court created for 
questions like this one, and that since both the United States and Mexico 
were members, the United States should agree to submit the dispute to that 
body for arbitration .3 
In an attempt to delay United States action against him Huerta agreed to 
salute the American flag provided O'Shaughnessy would sign a protocol agree¬ 
ing that the United States would return the salute volley for volley.^ 
3lWd. 
^Ibid., pp. h$9-h60. 
^Ibid., p. U6l. 
klbid., p. 1*68. 
3h 
Bryan instructed O'Shaughnessy not to sign the protocal because an agree¬ 
ment to return the salute "may be construed as recognition of his government 
whereas the President has no intention of recognizing the Huerta Govern¬ 
ment" Wilson instructed Bryan to inform Huerta through O'Shaughnessy, 
"That request for a simultaneous salute is, under all circumstances, as 
unjustifiable as the arrest of the American sailors and make it inpossible 
to consider further delay". On April 18, President Wilson in an ultimatum 
of his own told Huerta that unless he expressed his willingness to comply 
with Mayo's demand by 6 P.M. of the next day, he would lay the matter before 
Congress on April 20 "with a view to taking such action as may be necessary 
3 
to enforce the respect due the national flag". 
In view of the fact that Wilson had for thirteen months refused to be 
pressured into any drastic action as he now contemplated, and had declared 
in a message of August, 1913 that impatience in Mexico would be "childish, 
wrong and foolish", it was somewhat puzzling that he would go this length 
to secure a salute of the flagOne possible explanation is that he con¬ 
templated using this as an excuse for intervention and for forcing Huerta 
to resign. In regard to Wilson's action the Nation had -the following to say 
What has happened to break down the President's long fore- 
bearance? It would seem that he had borne the long grievances 
of thirteen months, resolute against war, only in the end to 
loose patience over a very little one. For it is clear that, 
if the Administration had chosen so to represent it, the Tampico 
incident would have appeared a negligible trifle.5 
■1Tbid., p. U71. 
^Ibid., p. U68. 
3 
Daniels, op. cit., p. 190. 
^Nation, April 23, 191il, p. U5l. 
5Ibid. 
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President Wilson, after having decided to back Mayo, had a conference 
with the leaders of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The committee 
members expressed alarmness at Huerta's action and stated that they were 
ready to support any law which the President desired.^ Senator Chilton 
2 
said, "I'd make them salute the flag if we had to blow up the whole place." 
Senator Borah is reported to have said, "If our flag is ever nan up in 
Mexico, it will never come down".3 Borah expressed the belief that possible 
action in Mexico could be "the beginning of the march of the United States 
to the Panama Canal".^ The expressions by these Senators showed inperalis- 
tic intentions, and while President Wilson did ncrt intend to use this inci¬ 
dent to promote American imperialism in Latin America, he did not argue 
this point with them because he wanted unity between himself and Congress 
during the approaching crisis. 
Although it was an accepted fact the President had -the power to act in 
this matter without an expressed consent from Congress, Wilson felt that 
since Congress was in session at this time, it would be best to go before the 
body and ask for specific authority.** In a message before a joint session 
of the two houses of Congress President Wilson said that the Tampico inci¬ 
dent; the arrest of an orderly fx*om the U. S. S. Minnesota while ashore in 
uniform at Vera Cruz to pick up the ship's mail; and the withholding of an 
official dispatch to the United States enfoassy at Mexico City by authorities 
of the Mexican telegraphic service until peremptorily demanded by the American 
charge in person were retaliations by Huerta far the refusal of the President 




%bid., Wilson cited the bombarding of Greytown, Nicaragua in 185U as a 
precedent for Presidential action without Congressional consent. 
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to recognize him.'*' Since there had been no similar complaints from other 
countries, Wilson said that he believed that these acts were reprisals which 
had been directed only against the United States. While the President 
asked for authority only to force the salute to the flag, he cited the other 
incidents which had strained relations between the United States and Mexico. 
The other complaints may have been cited to show that, excluding the refusal 
to salute the flag, the United States had grievances which would justify 
action against Huerta. 
The House of Representatives passed the desired resolution after only 
2 
four hours of debate by a vote of 323 to 29. Debate in the Senate lasted 
longer, and the resolution was not passed until April 22 by a vote of 72 
to 13. Senate delay was not due to any opposition to Wilson's request but 
to the fact that some Senators, such as Lodge and Root, wanted a broader 
basis for action than the mere refusal to salute the flag. Root expressed 
the opinion that the American people would not treat a poor weak country 
in such a way if a mere refusal to salute the flag was the only cause far 
action. In furthering this line of thought he said that the action was 
justified because of the violent and anarchic condition of Mexican affairs 
which had caused the loss of hundreds of American lives and millions of 
dollars' worth of American property 
The Senate resolution differed slightly from the House resolution, but 
it was accepted by the House without any debate. The resolution read as 
follows Î 
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 3U-3f>« 
2Baker, op. cit., IV, 327» 
^Ibid., p. 328. 
^Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 6986-6987. 
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Resolve, that the President is justified in the employ¬ 
ment of the armed forces c£ the United States to enforce his 
demands for the unequivocal amends for affronts and indigni¬ 
ties committed against the United States: be it further... 
Resolved, that the United States disclaims any hostility 
to the Mexican people or any purpose to mate war against 
them. 
Bryan in a telegram carrying the resolution to the diplomatic missions 
of the United States instructed the missions as follows: 
Please note that the w>rd 'justified* is used instead 
of 'authorized'. This was done to emphasize the fact that 
the resolution is not a declaration of war but contemplates 
only the specific redress of a specific indignity. 
The Wilson administration was very desirous of making it understood 
that the action to be taken was not war with Mexico. The implication was 
■that as soon as the specific redress had been satisfied, the United States 
would not take any further action. 
On April 21, the day before Congress granted Wilson pemission to use 
the armed forces in Mexico, news that a German ship, the Ypiranga, was going 
to arrive at Vera Cruz with a large amount of ammunitions for Huerta reached 
Wilson. The President sought the advice of Bryan and Daniels as to what 
course to take. Both advised him to crder Admiral Fletcher to prevent the 
o 
shipment from landing by seizing the customs house at Vera Cruz. The 
seriousness of such a move was fully recognized and was stressed by Wilson 
when he remarked to Bryan, "Of course, you understand which drastic action 
might mean in our relation to Mexico".3 The fear that war might result 
from the seizure of the customs house was expressed in the course of a 
XIbid., p. U83. 
2 
Daniels, op. cit., p. 193. 
3Ibid. 
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conversation with Tumulty when Wilson said: 
It is too bad isn't it, but we could not allow the cargo 
to land. The Mexicans intend using those guns upon our 
boys* It is hard to take actions of this kind. I have 
tided to keep out of this Mexican mess, but we are now 
on the brink of war and there is no alternative 
According to Wilson the taking of Vera Cruz was not intended as an act 
of war nor as an imperialistic adventure. The action was taken to save 
the dignity and the authority of the United States so 1hat it could continue 
to champion the cause of liberty throughout the world. This motive was ex¬ 
pressed when the President said: 
There can In what we do be no thought of aggression or 
selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and 
authority of the United States only because we wish always to 
to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, 
both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed 
for the benefit of mankind.2 
Even though the desire for territorial aggrandizement was denied, the 
action taken could have resulted in the occupation of Mexican territory for 
an indefinite time. 
While it was claimed that the true purpose of the Vera Cruz seizure was 
not the elimination of Huerta, it did present an opportunity far being used 
for such purpose. The seizure of the custom house could be used to cut off 
Huerta's source of income, as well as, prevent him from receiving supplies 
of arms and ammunitions from Europe. Without either of these he could not 
not maintain his power.3 Seisure of custom houses had been effectively used 
by Wilson's predecessors to break the power of Latin Amarican dictators. It 
Tumulty, op. cit., p. lf>2. 
2 
Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 102. 
^Julius W. Pratt, A History of the United States 
York, 19#), p. U29. 
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is conceivable that once in Vera Cruz, Wilson planned to use this seizure 
as a means of overthrowing Huerta, but abandoned the idea after humanitarians 
in the United States and the Carranza forces in Mexico reacted unfavorably 
to the occupation.'*’ 
The seizure of Vera Cruz aroused resentment among all of the warring 
2 
factions in Mexico. While Carranza did not agree with Huerta’s action and 
even -though he stated that the individual acts of Huerta would never involve 
Mexico in war with the United States because Huerta was "not the legitimate 
organ of our national sovereignty", he opposed the invasion of Mexico and 
the remaining of American troops in Mexico. He opposed because he felt that 
such acts violated Mexico's rights as a "free and independent sovereign 
entity" and because these were acts which "may indeed drag us into an un¬ 
equal war, with dignity, but which until today we have desired to avoid".^ 
Carranza's attitude alienated many of his sympathizers in the United States 
because they felt that if Huerta did not believe that the Constitutionalists 
would join him against the United States he would cease his antagonizing acts 
and then remove the cause for the occupation of Vera Cruz.*1 Any action that 
Carranza may have contemplated was rendered impotent when Villa created a 
break in the hi the rf ore solidarity of the Constitutionalist rank by declaring 
that he was in favor of the Vera Cruz seisure.^ In speaking of the effect 
of the Vera Cruz occupation on Wilson's Mexican policy Jose Vasconcelos says: 
# 
^-Arthur S. Link, The American Epoch (New York, 19f>5>), p. 67. 
^Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomacy, X, 17. 
^Foreign Relations, l?lli, pp. U83-383. 
**Ibid. 
^Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 126. 
The Vera Cruz disembarkment did no good whatsoever to 
the American nation or to the American interests in Mexico. 
It created a bad feeling against Americans, a bad feeling 
that had completely disappeared as a result of President 
Wilson's earlier human policy toward Mexico. The Vera 
Cruz incident harmed Mr. Wilson in the esteem of the 
Mexicans and did much harm to American prestige throughout 
Latin America. Perhaps it was the most serious mistake 
of Mr. Wilson's policies toward our country.1 
Realizing the seriousness of the presence of American forces in Mexico, 
the three leading countides of South America on April 2£, extended to the 
United States their services in mediating the crisis. The offer as signed 
and presented by D. da Gama, the Brazilian Ambassador; R. S. Naon, the 
Argentinian Minister and Edo. Suarez Mayica, the Chilean Minister, stated 
that the offer was made for "the purpose of serving the interests of 
peace and civilization in our continent and with the earnest desire to 
p 
prevent any further bloodshed...." Secretary Bryan with Wilson's per¬ 
mission accepted the offer by saying: 
Conscious of the purpose with which the proffer is made, 
this government does not feel at liberty to decline it. Its 
own chief interest is in the peace of America, the cordial 
intercourse of her republics and their people, and the happi¬ 
ness and prosperity which can spring only out of frank, mutual 
understandings, and the friendship which is created by common 
purpose. The general offer of your Governments is therefore 
accepted.3 
Wilson's quick acceptance of the mediation offer was due to the fact that 
it offered an escape from a very ugly predicament without further bloodshed 
or a loss of honor and dignity on the part of the United States. This 
feeling was expressed by him to his friend, Dr. Jacobus, on April 29 when 
^Rippy, Mexico, p. 117. 
^Foreign Relations, 191U, pp. I4.88-I189. 
•^Ibid., p. 1*89. 
he wrote: "I sun hoping (must admit a little against hope) for the best 
results from the mediation. We have been in a blind alley so long that 
I am longing for an exit".^ 
Huerta accepted the ABC powers' offer, and on May 20 the delegates 
from the United States and Mexico, along with the mediators, opened a 
session that lasted until July 2. Wilson intended to use the mediation 
not only for the settlement of the Vera Cruz crisis but also as a final 
solution for the entire Mexican problem. He attempted to set the tone of 
the meeting by declaring that the public opinion of the United States would 
not accept any mediation that did not provide for the elimination of Huerta 
and for the immediate establishment "in Mexico of a single government 
acceptable to all parties.. .upon the basis of such reforms as will satisfy 
the just claims of all the people of Mexico to life, liberty and independent 
o self support". Here Wilson was trying to use the conference as a means 
of accomplishing what his policy had so far failed to do. He was making an 
effort to use the conference to establish peace and constitutional govern¬ 
ment and to assure the success of a revolution designed to lift the down¬ 
trodden Mexicans without armed intervention by the United States. 
When the mediation conference convened, it was evident that the Con¬ 
stitutionalists were in a commanding position in Mexico and that Huerta's 
downfall was inevitable. Secretary Bryan realized this, and he saw in the 
conference an opportunity to settle the Mexican affair and not just the 
Vera Cruz incident. He informed the United States conferees of this in¬ 
tention by saying: 
^Baker, op, cit., IV, p. 335. 
2Ibid., p. 338. 
The object of our conferences now is to find a method by 
which the inevitable can be accomplished without bloodshed. 
By the inevitable we mean not merely the elimination of Huerta, 
but the completion of the revolution by the transfer of the 
political power from Huerta to those who represent the interests 
and aspirations of the people whose forces are now in the 
ascendancy. 
The statement referring to the transferring of "the power from Huerta to 
those who represent the interests and aspirations of the people whose 
forces are now in the ascendancy" was an overture for Carranza's coopera¬ 
tion in bringing the troublesome and embarrassing conditions in Mexico 
to a peaceful end. However, the Carranza delegates, who had been reluc¬ 
tantly sent to the conference, informed the American delegates in a secret 
meeting that their leader would not agree to a mediation of the civil war 
and that he would not accept the help of outsiders in effort to obtain 
office. Carranza's position resulted from a belief that if he acquired 
power with the aid of the United States, his tenure would be insecure and 
unstable because his country-men would look upon him as a puppet of the 
Wilson administration. 
When it became apparent that the conference could not mediate the civil 
war, the conferees set themselves to the task of bringing about temporary 
peace and restoring diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Mexico. The final agreement of the conference provided for the establish¬ 
ment of a provisional government composed of representatives from all of 
the warring factions; that as soon as the provisional government was es¬ 
tablished in Mexico City, the United States would recognize it immediately 
and would restore diplomatic relations with Mexico; and that the United 
States would not claim or insist upon a war indemnity or any other 
^Foreign Relations, 191iii p. 506. 
p 
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 127. 
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international satisfaction. ■*" The agreement worked out by the conference 
was very disappointing to Wilson because it did not call for the outright 
elimination of Huerta; did not mention any internal reforms; and did not 
require Huerta to salute the flag. Wilson was more disgusted when Huerta 
showed further contempt by refusing to sign the agreement. 
Although the conference failed to follow Wilson's expressed desires, 
it was really the greatest triumph of his entire Latin American policy. 
The Latin American countries which had looked upon the occupation of Vera 
Cruz as the first step in the annexation of Mexico were now convinced that 
Wilson was sincere in his earlier statement that the United States would 
not annex the territory of any Latin American country. Henry P. Fletcher, 
United States Minister to Chile at this time, wrote to Colonel House of 
"the President's success in the Mexican difficulties—turning as he did, 
a situation fraught with difficulties and dangers to our American relations 
2 
into a triumph of Pan-Americanism". The importance of this precedent 
was later expressed by Franklin D. Roosevelt who said: 
Here was an action which future statesmen can and should 
turn to to great advantage. The problem was a local one; 
Mexico is at our doors. Yet we hailed gladly the friendly 
offer of three other American republics, thousands of miles 
away, in another continent, to help work out a constructive 
solution. Only the explosion of the World War prevented the 
fruitful development of this method of dealing with Latin 
American difficulties.3 
The first phase of Wilson's policy, the elimination of Huerta, cane 
to an end on July 15 when Huerta resigned because he had lost the support 
^Foreign Relations, p. 5U6. 
p 
Seymour, op. cit., p. 207. 
^Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View", 
Foreign Affairs, VI, (July, 1928), 576. 
which his recognition by the European powers had given him and because he 
could no longer withstand the opposition of his foes. Without a doubt his 
resignation resulted from his failure to secure the recognition and backing 
of the United States. Wilson's watchful waiting had eliminated a tyrant 
without war, without alienation of Latin American opinion and without 
annexation of Mexican territory. 
Wilson was able to pursue his policy because the majority of the Ameri¬ 
can people were in favor of the principles behind it even though they did 
not agree with all of its facets. Besides the pressure from the "flag- 
maniacs" and the would-be bearers of the white man's burden who desired to 
see the map of Central America painted red, white and blue; the American 
interests who wanted protection for their investments; and the Catholic 
Church, the majority of the American people were not in favor of interven- 
o 
tion. The non-intervention principle was approved because the people did 
3 
not want war with their weak neighbor to the South. The attitude of the 
people was expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in correspondence of December 7, 
19lU to Henry Cabot lodge. In this correspondence he saidî 
When I came home from Europe and entered the campaign I 
was told that it would not do to attack the Administration on 
Mexico because the people generally felt that Wilson had kept 
us out of war.il 
The men for whom Roosevelt was campaigning did not want him to criticize 
Wilson's Mexican policy because they were afraid that such criticism would. 
"*Baker, op. cit., IV, 33U. 
%ew Republic, February 13, 1915, p. 32. 
Nation, April 23, 191U, p. Ii5l* 
^Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore 
Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1925), II, Li|8. 
cost them votes in the election because the President's policy was too 
Republicans, as well as Democrats, favored the non-intervention prin¬ 
ciple of watchful waiting. Theodore Roosevelt was very disturbed over the 
Republican's acceptance of the policy. This attitude was expressed by him 
in a letter of December 8, 191U when he said: 
Nothing irritated me more last summer than the attitude 
of my own friends and also of the Republicans towards Wilson's 
foreign policy, especially in Mexico. My own friends and sup¬ 
porters besought me not to touch him, and whatever they said 
themselves was really in his favor. The Republicans took the 
same ground. They criticized him about the tariff, but fell 
over themselves to say that they supported him for his noble 
and humanitarian peace policy. They took the ground over and 
over again here in New York, viewing with the Democrats in saying 
how splendid it was that Wilson had kept us out of war with 
Mexico...2 
The record of the second session of the sixty-fourth Congress showed that 
Wilson had bi-partisan support for the non-intervention principles of his 
While the non-intervention principle was highly accepted, the non¬ 
recognition of Huerta was criticized by many of the American people. Critics 
of this phase of the policy said that it was foolish to attempt to oust a 
those who disapproved of Huerta's tyrannical acts did not feel that Wilson 
should prolong the confusion which already existed in Mexico by refusing 
to recognize him on moral grounds. Critics of the non-recognition principle 
George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement 
(University of Wisconsin, I9J4.6), p. 308. 
^Lodge, op. cit., II, U49. 
^Congressional Record, 6Uth Congress, 2nd Session, p. 2130. 
popular with the people. 1 
U6 
denounced it as a policy of nhigh idealism with absolute inability to 
foresee the reaction which his views and efforts would produce on other 
people".^ In referring to this phase of Wilson's policy, Henry L. Stinson, 
one of his later critics, saids 
Whatever theoretical advantages there might be in the 
Wilson policy, it was certain to be ineffective in practice. 
Free constitutional institutions could not be imposed on a 
sovereign nation by the diplomatic device of non-recognition. 
^Henry L. Stinson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and 
War (New York, 1<?U8), p.i?8. 
2-, •Ibid. 
CHAPTER III 
RELATIONS WITH CARRANZA 
The resignation of Huerta did not bring peace to Mexico. According 
to the mediation agreement of the ABC powers a provisional government 
agreed to by the warring factions should be established and that upon its 
establishment it was to receive the recognition of the United States. It 
was believed that a provisional government with United States’ recognition 
could bring stability to Mexico, provide for elections for a permanent 
government and thus guarantee constitutional government. Carranza and his 
Constitutionalists were the strongest faction, but the failure of the other 
chieftains to accept his leadership caused the chaotic conditions to con¬ 
tinue. The split within the Constitutionalists caused by Villa's break 
with Carranza added further to the chaos. Conditions during the last six 
months of 19Ü4 made it appear that the Mexican upheaval was no longer a 
movement to overthrow a tyrant and to bring about improvements in the lives 
of the Mexican masses. The struggle began to assume the character of a fight 
between ambitious and greedy men for power. 
Wilson's sympathy was with the Constitutionalists because he believed 
that Carranza, more than the others, represented the principles of the 
revolution and that he was more able to bring about peace in Mexico. In 
spite of Wilson's overtures, Carranza remained somewhat indifferent and 
non-cooperative. This attitude of Carranza's resulted from the difference 
in the views of the two men. Wilson stood for internationalism, while 
Carranza was a firm believer in nationalism. Pan-Americanism caused Wilson 
U7 
to attempt to shape the course of the Mexican revolution, so as to gain a 
victory for this ideal. Carranza was a nationalist, who, while believing 
in the principles of the revolution, resented any advice or coercion from 
outsiders. The attempts of outsiders to influence Mexican affairs were 
repugnant to Carranza because he believed that the Mexicans should be left 
alone to work out their own destiny. Carranza believed that acceptance 
of Wilson's blessings would alienate him with the people of Mexico and 
cause them to look upon him as a puppet of the United States. This atti¬ 
tude caused him to rebuff every advance made by Wilson to secure his coopera¬ 
tion. 
American troops were still in Vera Cruz and their tenure there was in 
a measure dependent upon the establishment of a government which the United 
States could recognize as the de facto government of Mexico. The presence 
of these troops increased the anti-American feeling which had developed 
1 
from the time of their arrival. All of the warring factions agreed that 
American forces should be withdrawn because the presence of foreign troops 
p 
offended their "dignity as patriots". In the absence of a recognized 
government that could be held responsible for protecting the Mexicans who 
had aided the United States in the government of Vera Cruz, Wilson asked 
Carranza to assume this responsibility so that the troops could be withdrawn.-^ 
Carranza accepted and on November 23, 19 lU the troops were withdrawn. The 
removal of the American troops proved the sincerity of Wilson's earlier 
^Foreign Relations, 1911|, p. 597» 
^Ibid., p. 595. 
•^Baker, op. cit., VI, 57-58. 
h9 
statement that the United States would respect Mexico's sovereignty and 
that it did not seek any territorial gains in Mexico. Gratitude for 
freeing Vera Cruz from the presence of occupational troops was expressed 
by the orator of the day at an Independence Day Celebration at Chapultepic 
in the following words: 
I am sure, gentlemen,' that the much discussed question of 
Vera Cruz is the only motive which has aroused all good Mexi¬ 
cans to appear reserved and not to manifest the immense 
sentiment of gratitude felt toward the man who has slain evil 
and who has demonstrated, in the midst of problems most 
difficult and profound, that the only policy worthy of the 
age in which we live is the policy of honor and truth. The 
last shadow, the darkest of all, having vanished from our 
national life, we now render homage to a great and sincere 
man, the great representative American. 
Continued anarchy in Mexico caused much criticism of the continued 
policy of watchful waiting. The President attempted to offset this criti¬ 
cism by insisting that a peaceful solution was near. In spite of the 
criticism of his policy and the continued anarchy in Mexico, he held firmly 
p 
to his policy of not doing anything that was not friendly to Mexico. 
Critics said that his Mexican policy was a failure and characterized it as 
having been "at once stubborn, vacillating and unimpressive", and said 
that "its only merit has been its good intentions".-^ Many suggested that 
he either recognize the de facto President of Mexico, regardless of who he 
was, or leave the internal affairs of Mexico alone, and use his influence 
' - .». 
only to protect Mexico's independence from Europe and the rights of Americans 
and Europeans in Mexico or "intervene effectively and by force of arms, 
seizing and holding the ports and various strategic points, and himself 
^Foreign Relations, 191i+, p. 598. 
2 Baker and Dodd, op. cit., I, 177» 
%ew Republic, November 28, 191U, p. 3. 
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conducting the elections which will put a President in power".'*' Opponents 
called watchful waiting a policy of aimless drifting or in fact no policy 
O 
at all. They admitted that each of the two suggested policies had its 
drawbacks, but that acceptance of one or the other could give a definite 
policy and would offer some chance of bringing about a consummation of the 
anarchy in Mexico. ^ 
Not only was Wilson’s policy hampered by the continued civil war in 
Mexico, but his position became further complicated when some American citi¬ 
zens in Naco, Arizona were wounded by shots fired from the Mexican side of 
the border. In a telegram of December 9, 19lU, Secretary Bryan instructed 
Consul Canada to inform Carranza to warn those who were subject to his 
allegiance to refrain from further violations of the rights of American 
citizens or else the United States would have to take action itself.^ The 
telegram said: 
Unless those in authority can prevent the firing of shots 
across the border it will become the duty of this Government, 
much to its regret, to take such steps as may be necessary to 
protect American lives thus menaced by the employment of 
such forces as may be required. Such forces to be employed 
not for aggression but purely for defense and with no in¬ 
tention of invading the territory of Mexico or in any way 
interfering with its sovereignty or the rights of the people 
to settle their disputes among themselves.5 
On December 12 Carranza replied to Consul Canada's note. He stated 
that the Constitutionalists were not responsible for the shots fired and 




^Foreign Relations, 191U, p. 61*9. 
5ï Ibid. 
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"would have to be considered by this Government as an act of hostility 
and an attack against the sovereignty of Mexico, independently of the 
pacific or well-disposed intentions that might cover the employment of 
The reply reflected the nationalist view of Carranza, and may be viewed 
as an attempt by him to strengthen his position by appearing to the Mexi¬ 
cans as the defender of Mexico's sovereignty. Carranza further stated that 
the use of force by the United States would endanger the Constitutionalists' 
chances for victory. In support of this argument he said: 
With the Constitutionalist forces occupying Naco and 
those of General Villa attacking it, any intervention on 
the part of American forces to end the struggle would 
have the defacto nature of a step taken exclusively against 
the Constitutionalists and in favor of the Villistas, since 
the employment of force would result in reducing the Constitu¬ 
tionalists to impotence by diverting their attention, leaving 
the Villista forces free to continue their military operations. 
In spite of the obstacles of his efforts to benefit Mexico, President 
Wilson in his annual message to Congress on December 7, 1915 stated again 
the position of the administration in Mexico and expressed the feeling that 
the trouble there would soon disappear. He stated that the United States 
had proven its belief in the right of the people to choose their own type 
of government by not attempting to force a government of its own choice 
upon Mexico. In this connection he saidt 
We have been put to the acid test in the case of Mexico, 
and we have stood the test. Whether we have benefitted 





Her fortiines are in her own hands. But we have at least 
proved that we will not take advantage of her in distress 
and undertake to impose upon her an order and government 
of our own choosing. 1 
In defense of his policy he quoted that passage of the Virginia Bill 
of Rights which said: 
That government is, or ought to be instituted for the 
common benefit, protection and security of the people, 
nation, or community and that of all the various modes 
and forms of government, that is the best which is capable 
of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, 
and is most effectively secured against the danger of mal¬ 
administration, and that when any government shall be found 
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the 
community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible 
right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall 
be judged most condusive to the public weal.2 
By quoting this passage in defense of his policy Wilson beyond a doubt ex¬ 
pressed his belief in revolution as a means of abolishing tyrannical govern¬ 
ment. In the course of his address he added that this belief had been 
applied in the case of Mexico and that he hopefully awaited "the rebirth 
of the troubled Republic, which had so much of which to purge itself and 
so little sympathy from any outside quarter in the radical but necessary 
process".3 Emphasis was again put on the fact that the United States would 
not coerce Mexico but would do all within its power to aid her. The course 
pursuéd in Mexico Wilson said was proof that "we seek no political 
suzerainty or selfish control".^ 
Watchful waiting continued to be Wilson's policy because he still looked 
& " 'T ■. ' Lf- ■ 
upon the civil war as a struggle for human freedom and he stood firm in his 
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position that as long as the struggle was for this purpose the United States 
baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, U08. 




would not interfere. Many of those who sympathized with the policy of 
non-intervention opposed the view that the United States would not inter¬ 
fere as long as the fighting was for human freedom. It was believed that 
if the Mexican leaders did not feel free from outside interference they 
would make some attempt to settle their differences. The wisdom of the 
President's position was questionned in various newspapers and magazines. 
Typical of the attitude of these was an editorial in the New Republic which 
The President is assuredly right in giving the Mexicans 
the utmost practicable opportunity of recovering their self- 
possession and of establishing some kind of political and 
social order. He is right in sympathizing with their devo¬ 
tion to national independence. Armed intervention by this 
country in Mexico would bring with it consequences, burdens 
and risks which might be more costly to the American than 
to the Mexican people. But is the President wise in serving 
notice on the Mexican generals that no matter how wantonly they 
fight among themselves their fighting is consecrated in the name 
of human liberty and is safe from outside interference? Are the 
Mexicans not much more likely to compose their differences in 
case they are asked to recognize the existence of an ultimate 
international policy power and of its possible application to 
their dissensions?^ 
Those who favored "watchful waiting" as a tentative policy opposed 
2 
Wilson's attempt to transform it into "an immaculate and absolute dogma". 
Such attempt they believed was contrary to the historical teaching that 
"no country can in the long run be allowed to behave as it pleases without 
regard to the interests and standards of other nations".^ 
Sr? V - f' f v ' •. " V' ' : , ; : ' ' ■ : : 
Not only did the wanton fighting continue, but anti-foreign feeling in 
• & 
Mexico continued and American lives and property were very insecure. 
stated: 
ew Republic, January 23, 1915* P* 7. 
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General Obregon, an officer under Carranza's command, made several anti- 
foreign speeches which were of the nature that could have easily caused 
riots against the foreigners residing in Mexico. In addition to these 
infammatory speeches he gave the Mexicans the assurence that if anti- 
foreign riots occurred, he would not resist them.’*- Bryan: on March 5» 
I9IS informed Wilson of Obregon's tactics and stated that the United States 
was not in a position to protect Americans and other foreigners because its 
nearest troops were in Texas. Wilson replied to Bryan by instructing him 
to inform Carranza that Obregon's "extraordinary and unpardonable course" 
had renewed the talk of a joint action by several countries to protect their 
nationals in Nexico City and that if he did not check Obregon he was run- 
3 
ning a serious risk. Furthermore Wilson asked Bryan to check with Secre¬ 
tary Daniels to see if he had ships with long range guns (not necessarily 
battleships) which if necessary he could order immediately to Mexico (Vera 
Cru^ and to let him know at once.^ 
Lansing, at the time a counselor for the State Department, warned Bryan 
of the possible outcomes of applying force in Mexico. He stated that the 
Mexicans would look upon it as an attempt to permanently occupy their lands 
and to dominate their government and would resist it regardless of the 
motives behind it. Such course Lansing felt would create a suspicion in 
_v. • ,K :. * >„ . ; •vm'j p | .-t. .• * ' 
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other Latin American countries of the motives of the administration. In 
addition to these repercussions Counselor Lansing stated that if the United 
States went into Mexico, the foreign governments would expect her to remain 
■^Robert Lansing, The Lansing Papers, 191U-1920 (Washington, 1939), II» 




there in order to protect the interests of their nationals. Instead of 
force Lansing suggested joint action by the A. B G Powers and the United 
States on the basis "that the political and industrial conditions in Mexi¬ 
co could no longer be tolerated and that in the interest of the Mexican 
people and humanity the four powers had united to restore order and stable 
government in the Republic, and that they guaranteed the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Mexico when the purpose of their 
2 
intervention had been accomplished". This suggestion proved significant 
later on because it led to a chain of events which brought recognition to 
Carranza in an effort to end chaos in Mexico. 
As time went by the need for action in Mexico became more apparent. 
In a letter of March 15, 1915 from Paris, Colonel House emphasized the need 
of settling the Mexican question before the war ended because as soon as 
the war was over the European pow&rs were going to insist upon the restora¬ 
tion of order in Mexico.3 House had suggested joint action of the ABC 
powers and the United States as early as January, 1915 > but at that time 
Wilson was unwilling to take such positive action. In this letter House 
emphasized the need of such course. He said to Wilson: 
This seems to me the wisest solution. I think that you 
have given them (the Mexicans) every chance to work it out 
-• themselves, and help should be offered them and insisted 
upon. 
As conditions became, worse Wilson's unwillingness to accept joint action 
by the A. B C powers and the United States became less stubborn. In a note 
~*~Ibid., p. 530. 
2Ibid. 
^Seymour, op. cit., I, 220. 
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of June 2, 1915 to Bryan he said: 
I am entirely open to anything that events may open to 
us, even the recognition of Carranza if he should develop 
the necessary influence and begin to bring real order out 
of chaos.1 
Carranza's stubborn resistance to pressure from the United 
States to compromise with the leaders of the other warring factions had 
the effect of prolonging the disorder in Mexico. Wilson became impatient 
and on June 2, 1915 instructed Bryan to convey to Mexican authorities through 
the Brazilian Minister to Mexico the message that if the warring factions 
could get together and restore order, the United States would: 
...do what it has not hitherto done or felt at liberty to do, 
lend its active moral support to some man or group of men, if 
such may be found, who can rally the suffering people of 
Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they cannot 
unite, the warring factions of the country, return to the 
Constitution of the Republic so long in abeyancej and set up 
a government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world 
can recognize and deal with, whom the program of the revolu¬ 
tion will be a business and not merely a platform.2 
This threat of intervention was broadened with the assertion that if the 
leaders did not settle their differences and unite for the purpose of 
bringing order to Mexico within a very short time the United States would 
be constrained to decide what means it would employ "in order to help 
Mexico save herself and serve her people". Bryan saw in this message 
dangerous possibilities of intervention, but he gave in and telegraphed 
this message to the Brazilian Minister.^ This was one of Bryan's last 
Lansing, op. cit., II, %3b* 
^Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 69U-695. 
3Ibid., p. 695. 
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official acts as Secretary of the State. 
On June 18, Lansing, who became Secretary of State ad interim, in¬ 
structed Special Agent Silliman to inform Carranza that the United States 
was looking forward to a conciliation between the factions which would 
restore order and peace in Mexico.^" Silliman was told to emphasize to 
Carranza the fact that the United States was inclined to adopt any measures 
that would preserve Mexico for herself and the world and to intimate cau¬ 
tiously that as things were then shaping up that the United States might 
even recognize him. However, Silliman was instructed to make it clear to 
Carranza that if he did not give a wholehearted effort through a conference 
with all the leaders to adjust the differences between them and to restore 
peaceful conditions that the United States would not ever consider recog¬ 
nizing him, much less adopting this course.^ Silliman on June 22 informed 
Lansing that Carranza refused to consider a conciliation with Villa and the 
other leaders because he felt that any such revolutionary government es¬ 
tablished upon conciliation would be disappointing, ineffective and fruit¬ 
less.^ Silliman informed Lansing that Carranza said thati 
The Constitutionalists cannot unitewith the factions 
represented by the rebel chiefs, Villa and Zapata. History 
furnishes no example in any age of any country of civil war 
terminating by the pa ion of contending parties. One or the 
other must triumph.h 
The possible extension of recognition by the United States did not change 
Carranza's position that he would not have a recognition that was conditioned 
on his acceptance of conciliation with his opponents. 
^Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 715-716. 
2Ibid., p. 716. 
3Ibid., pp. 718-719. 
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In August Secretary Lansing's proposal for a meeting of the leading 
countries of Latin America and the United States for the purpose of 
finding some solution for the Mexican problem became a reality. Repre¬ 
sentatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay, 
together with those from the United States, met in Washington on August 
5 for an informal conference. Lansing made it plain to the conferees that 
the conference was not called to formulate plans for joint action against 
Mexico, but was called merely to aid the Mexican people out of their dis¬ 
tressful conditions by "seeking to recognize a government which would 
restore peace, secure individual rights and perform its international 
obligations..."1 He further expressed the belief in the principle of 
revolution in order to restore constitutional government, but felt that this 
2 
principle had triumphed the year before when Huerta was forced to resign. 
The conference agreed with Lansing's view that since no faction represented 
the revolution, but that all of them combined did represent it, "the con¬ 
ference must seek for a new government among the factions and see if their 
differences could not be adjusted at least sufficiently to have the greater 
part unite on a provisional government strong enough and honest enough to 
3 
command respect at home and abroad and to obtain recognition". Emphasis 
was put on the fact that while the conference was seeking to bring about 
a provisional government, the sovereignty of Mexico was not to be invaded 
in any way.^ 
In an effort to bring unity among the different factions the conference 
invited the leaders to meet in a conference and arrange for a general 





agreement and orderly elections.^" All of the leaders except Carranza 
agreed to such move. Without Carranza's agreement the meeting would be 
fruitless because at this particular time he and his Constitutionalist 
Party held the greatest power in Mexico. The stubbomess of Carranza 
caused the conference to assume the attitude that he was impossible and 
should be eliminated as the possible head of a government that might merit 
recognition. ^ It was felt that even if Carranza did triumph, disorders 
would continue and that he should be eliminated in favor of a man who was 
able to gain the support of the secondary chiefs.^ President Wilson opposed 
the conference's insistence upon Carranza's elimination on the ground that 
to him it was unwise. Wilson felt that the plan should be flexible enough 
to include Carranza and thereby leave open more than one possible course 
of action.^ 
Lansing's scheme of making it possible for Villa to obtain funds by ex¬ 
porting cattle to the United States was accepted by WilsonThis was done 
to keep Villa in arms long to make it appear to Carranza that he had some 
serious opposition. This scheme would probably prolong the strife, but it 
would also probably help to break Carranza's stubbomess and make him more 
inclined to some kind of compromise.^ 
During the period between the adjournment of the conference and October 
8, the time for its reconvening, certain factors were favoring the recognition 
of Carranza. First, Carranza changed.his disposition and showed an 
^Seymour, op. cit., I, 223. 
^Lansing, op. cit., II, 5Uu 
^Ibid. 
j*Ibid., p. 3^9. 
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inclination of willingness to discuss the factors which would determine if 
his government would be recognized. While Carranza showed this willingness, 
he offset its importance by insisting that the conference should be held 
on Mexican soil. Lansing objected to a conference on Mexican soil and 
\ ..■. r%-^ ; ■- . •»:*• , -r. O'. ...y*,£"****■ 
also insisted that the factors to be discussed must include Carranza's 
ability to restore peace, stability of his government and his ability as 
well as his willingness to assume international responsibility.'*' Secondly, 
Villa's forces had disintegrated, therefore, supporting or aiding Villa 
could serve no good purpose. Such aid would only prolong the strife. On 
the account of these two factors Lansing on September 12 informed Wilson 
that he was certain that in the end Carranza would win and that by giving 
moral support to him and his government the United States could bring the 
2 
strife nearer to an end. 
Even though Carranza on September 10 refused to appoint a representative 
to attend a meeting to work out some kind of conciliation, his chances of 
becoming recognized by the United States were increasing. On September 23, 
President Wilson told Colonel House that when the conference reconvened in 
October 8 the United States would probably have to recognize the Consti¬ 
tutionalist faction. Both agreed that recognition would be given only if 
Carranza guaranteed religious freedom, granted amnesty for all political 
offenses, inaugurated the land reforms which he has promised, gave protec¬ 
tion to foreigners and recognized their just claims.3 These conditions in¬ 
dicated that Wilson still attempted to use the extending of recognition as 
•‘•Ibid., pp. 550-551. 
2Ibid., p. 551. 
^Seymour, op. cit., 223-22k* 
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a means of establishing some of the revolutionary principles in Mexico. 
Wilson and House believed that Obregon was chiefly responsible for the 
success of the Constitutionalists and that soon he rather than Carranza 
would be "man of the hour in Mexico".^ Thus the recognition extended to 
the Constitutionalists would ultimately pass to Obregon who would be more 
likely to follow advice from the United States than was Carranza. 
Recognition of Carranza offered Wilson an avenue of escape from the per¬ 
plexing and embarrassing Mexican situation. By recognizing the Carranzists 
Wilson would be practically washing his hands of the Mexican affair and 
future dealings with the Mexican government would be only for the purpose 
of satisfying the claims of American citizens against it. Dealing other 
than those concerned with these claims and their adjustments would be 
fruitless because Carranza would not accept American advice after recogni- 
O 
tion any more than before. Recognition of Carranza would leave Mexico's 
fortunes in its own hands and would possibly avoid United States inter¬ 
vention . 
Even though Carranza refused to accept the invitation to meet with the 
other Mexican leaders, the turn of events together with Lansing's persuasion 
caused the Latin American conferees to recommend that the Carranzists be 
recognized as the de facto government. On September 10 when Carranza 
definitely refused to attempt any sort of conciliation, his forces were 
capturing the Villista stronghold of Tarreon. This victory and the unity 
that was found in the Carranzists forces convinced Lansing that recognition 
should not be delayed any longer. The Latin American envoys were represen¬ 
tatives of reactionary governments and were therefore hostile to the Mexican 
•^Ibid., p. 22U. 
%ew Republic, October 2, 1915, p. 221. 
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Revolution. Lansing overcame the hostility of the reactionary conferees 
by convincing them that the sovereignty of Mexico at the time resided in 
the revolutionary armies, and that since the Constitutionalists controlled 
most of the country, that faction was really the de facto government.^ On 
October 19 the Carranza faction was given de facto recognition by the 
United States and its six Latin American associates. 
Carranza had received the recognition of the United States in spite of 
his non-cooperative and sometimes antagonistic attitude. His position had 
been made possible by the man whom he had opposed in practically all of his 
efforts to refrain from intervening in Mexico. Wilson's altruism and his 
attempt to bring about a reign of law and order based on the consent of the 
governed were rebuffed on every hand by Carranza who viewed Wilson's efforts 
as attempts to encroach upon Mexico's sovereignty and national honor. 
Wilson's recognition of Carranza in conjunction with and upon the advice 
of the .leading Latin American countries was a significant victory for Pan- 
p 
Americanism. By his willingness to submit to the recommendation of the 
Latin American representatives Wilson proved the sincerity of his statement 
that the United States had no imperialistic designs in Latin America. In¬ 
stead of taking advantage of a situation, if judged by the standards of 
European diplomacy at that time, and making a protectorate or virtual pro¬ 
tectorate of Mexico, he chose rather to take a course of action which left 
the Mexicans free to determine their own destiny. This action did much to 
bring Latin America closer to the United States. 
For a time it appeared that cordial relations between the United States 
-*-Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, pp. 134-135». 
2 
Seymour, op. cit., I, 224. 
63 
and Mexico were about to be restored. However, this optimism was soon to 
be shattered because of the crisis that was created by Villa's attempt 
to undermine the Carranza government. The scheme of Villa would show his 
resentment of United States for recognizing Carranza and would at the same 
time discredit the de facto government by putting it in an embarrassing 
situation. Resentment against the United States would be shown by mass 
murdering of American citizens residing in the Northern states of Mexico. 
This would result in the United States putting pressure on Carranza to 
stop these outrages, and if he could not stop them, intervention might be 
pursued. Intervention by the United States would discredit the Carranza 
government. 
On January 11, 1916 Villa removed seventeen Americans from a train at 
Santa Ysabel and murdered sixteen of them. This incident, together with 
other murders along the borders, created a wave of anger and indignation 
in the United States. Demands for invasion of Mexican territory to appre¬ 
hend the murderers arose from all sections and particularly along the borders. 
Critics of Wilson's handling of the crisis claimed that he was more inter¬ 
ested in preventing interference in Mexico than he was in protecting American 
lives and property.1 They felt that the President should make it clear that 
the wantonly destruction of American lives in the Northern states of Mexico 
and along the borders would no longer be tolerated, and that if the Carranza 
government could not prevent it, the United States would take the steps 
2 necessary to do so. Hi an attempt to answer the criticism of his policy 
Wilson tried to show that the United States should not become hysterical, 
-*New Republic, January 22, 1916, p. 287* 
2Ibid. 
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but should hesitate to take any action that might involve the two coun¬ 
tries in war. He stated that the United States, unlike Mexico, had no 
fear of the invasion of its territory and because of this, it could wait 
long enough to try for a peaceful solution. He attempted to show that the 
fears of the United States were minor ones by saying: "What Americans 
have to fear, if she has anything to fear, are indirect, round-about flank 
movement upon her regnant position in the Western Hemisphere.1^ 
Carranza attempted to show that efforts were being made to apprehend 
Villa by issuing a degree which placed Villa and the other bandit leaders, 
Rafafel Castro and Fable Lopez, outside of the law. This decree gave any 
citizen of Mexico the right to apprehend and execute them without any 
O 
formality other than their identification. In spite of this decree Villa 
remained at large and continued his raids and murders. On March 9 he raided 
Columbus, New Nexico, killed seventeen Americans and carried away many 
horses. This incident stirred up more anger than the one at Santa Ysabel 
because it was executed on American soil and appeared as a climax to a long 
series of attacks against American lives both in Mexico and in America by 
a bandit who was beyond the power of the Mexican government to apprehend and 
punish. 
The indignation caused by the Columbus affair forced President Wilson to 
take a more aggressive position than he had taken in the other raids. On 
March 10 he announced through the press that a force large enough to capture 
3 
Villa and to put an end to the forays would be sent into Mexico. He em¬ 
phasized that the expedition would be solely for the capture of Villa and 
^Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 9. 
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was not in any way to disrespect the sovereignty of Mexico.^ The press 
was asked to keep this purpose before the American people and "the dis¬ 
tressed and sensitive people of Mexico, who are very susceptible, indeed 
to impressions received from the American press not only, but also very 
ready to believe that those impressions proceed from the views and object 
■ p 
of our Government itself". Finally, the press was urged not to picture the 
sending of troops as war against Mexico. 
Carranza had not been consulted about the sending of troops into Mexi¬ 
co because it was felt that if he either consented or cooperated, it would 
cause resentment against him in Mexico and thus make the political situa- 
-3 
tion there more difficult. While the position of Carranza in Mexico was 
considered in not seeking his permission or cooperation, Wilson and Lansing 
knew that even if they had asked, the request would have been refused, in¬ 
dication that the presence of American troops on Mexican soil would be re¬ 
sented was shown when the Mexican authorities rushed troops to Juarez in 
an effort to claim that the action anticipated by the United States was 
unnecessary.^ Resentment arose throughout Mexico over the proposed action 
of Wilson. Even the Mexicans who opposed the deeds of Villa looked upon 
the sending of troops as a violation of Mexico's sovereignty. Wilson's 
anticipated action was contradictory to his delcaration that the sovereignty 
of Mexico would not be violated because the sending of troops into that 
country without the consent of its authorities was in itself a violation of 
the country's sovereignty. 
^Ibid. 
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Acuna, who was in charge of Mexico's Department of Foreign Relations, 
expressed Mexico's regret far the Columbus affair* He attempted to compare 
the incident with the raids of Indians of Sonera and Chihuahua in 1880 and 
188U-1886 repsectively. Since the Columbus raid was similar to those at 
Sonora and Chihuahua, Acuna declared that the same plan for apprehending 
the outlaws should be used. The agreement referred to was that the armed 
forces of either country couldfteely cross into the territory of the other to 
pursue and chastise the bandits* Because of his desire to exterminate Villa 
and his horde and to prevent future outrages along the borders Acuna stated 
that Carranza asked that the precedent used in the Sonora and Chihuahus in¬ 
cidents be followed*^ 
The sentiment in Mexico forced Carranza, even if he had been inclined to 
the contrary, to make all possible attempts to prevent the proposed invasion 
of Mexico. In addition to the unfavorable sentiment of the Mexicans, Carran¬ 
za's staunch belief in the principle of nationalism caused him to oppose the 
presence of American troops in Mexico. In order to appear the defender of 
Mexico's sovereignty he insisted that if the proposal of mutual permission 
to cross each other's territory was not accepted and instead Mexico's terri¬ 
tory was violated, "my government shall consider this act as an invasion of 
o 
our national territory". Further attempts to offset the plan to invade 
Mexico were made by declaring that it would be unfair to hold the government 
and people of Mexico responsible for an act committed by a bandit that the 
government had placed outside the law; that invasion of Mexico would not 
assure the capture of Villa but would result in a war thich would cause a 
^Xbid., p. 1*8$. 
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great loss of lives and property; that invasion would play into the hands 
of Villa by bringing on the war he hoped to create; and that "such war 
would be the most unjust which modern history would record and it would 
/ 
also be an evident proof of the lack of sincereity of the American government". 
On March 13 Lansing with Wilson's consent instructed Special Agent Silliman 
to inform Acuna that the United States would, in the interest of peace and 
order, consent to the mutual crossing of each other's borders to pursue 
2 
bandits who committed crimes on either side and fled to the other. 
Believing that the message to Acuna accepting the mutual permission 
principle had granted the United States the right to invade Mexico terri¬ 
tory to pursue and capture Villa, General Pershing was ordered into Mexico 
on March 15. In order to remove all doubts as to the intentions of the United 
States a Congressional Resolution was passed on March 17 stating that the sole 
purpose of the expedition was to capture Villa and that "such military expe¬ 
dition shall not be permitted to encorach in any degree upon the sovereignty 
of Mexico or to interfere in any manner with the domestic affairs of the 
Mexican people".3 The Congressional Resolution concurred with Wilson's 
position that the invasion of Mexico was for the reddress of a grievance for 
which there was no other remedy. Lansing on March 13 had stated that the pro¬ 
posal to send troops after Villa was not to be looked upon as an attempt to 
infringe upon Mexico's sovereignty but was a deliberate attempt "to preclude 
the possibility of intervention".^ 
Public sentiment in the United States looked upon Wilson» s action as 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 488. 
3lbid., pp. 491-492. 
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a necessary step for the protection of American lives and property in Mexico 
and on American t erritory along the borders. Americans agreed with the 
action even though they realized that such action could possibly require 
American troops to remain in Mexico for a long time and that it might result 
r 1 'N * '} ’ *■»•> • **** * - ^ ^ $ If. ~ .1 * 1 ‘ . î' -, • . :» * , 
in the United States assuming the more difficult task of policing the border. 
An editorial in the Mew Republic expressed the attitude of the majority of 
the American people when it said: 
The United States has had a dangerous and costly job forced 
upon it, a job which might involve the temporary military 
occupation of some of the territory of a disorderly neighbor. 
It has accepted the burden with reluctance but without hesita¬ 
tion and without any intention of making it a pretext for t he 
subjugation of Mexico.^ 
Mexico's reaction to the Pershing expedition was one of hostility. E. 
Arredondo, the Mexican representative in Washington, informed Secretary Lan¬ 
sing on March 18 that American troops had entered Mexico via Palomas in pur¬ 
suit of Villa but in the absence of terms and agreements between the two 
countries. He stated that his government had authorized him to make it clear 
that it could not grant American troops permission to cross into Mexican 
territory until the terms of the mutual agreement had b een definitely and con¬ 
cisely fixed.3 The United States had sent the Pershing expedition across the 
borders in the belief that its acceptance of the mutual agreement pact was all 
that was needed and that the arrangement was complete. Acting Secretary of 
State Polk informed Arredondo that the United States still felt that no 
further agreement were necessary; that further delay would hinder Villa's 
capture; and since the United States had agreed to respect Mexican sovereignty, 
he did not feel that any friction would occurWhile the United States did 
^New -Republic, March 10, 1916*, p. 16$ 
2 Ibid. 
^Foreign Relations. 1916, p. 493» 
^Tbid., pp. 488-499* 
69 
not agree to withdraw its troops, Polk did state that his country would gladly 
accept any suggestion made to cover the operation of troops in either country 
1 
under the particular conditions. This was a definite attempt to prevent the 
expedition from appearing as a humiliating and embarrassing act committed by 
a strong and powerful nation against its weak neighbor. 
Repeated efforts and expressions were made by the Wilson administration 
to assure the Mexican government that the search for Villa would not violate 
its sovereignty and that it was not the beginning of an imperialist adventure. 
On March 20, Polk instructed United States Special Agent, Rogers, to assure 
Carranza that the United States would retire from Mexico as soon as it or the 
de facto government captured Villa and that the American troops would not 
deviate from its instructions not to violate Mexico’s sovereignty. In view 
of this position Polk went on to say that there was really no cause for the 
2 
misunderstanding that had been aroused by Mexico. In a statement of March 
25 (appeared in New York Times on March 26) Wilson emphasized that the Pershing 
expedition was only a punitive measure aimed solely at the elimination of the 
marauders who were attacking the lives and property of American citizens on 
American soil; that the American commanders would cooperate with de facto 
government in every way possible to accomplish this object; and that the 
American soldiers would withdraw from Mexico as soon as the object was 
accomplished.^ 
Wilson stood firmly on his position not to use the expedition to intervene 
>;t* • ' / ■ ' r, ^ ) •/" • , . • C \ Vj£»r I f, -;I ? * f i •• / ' : yj" * \ , .. 
in Mexico in order to protect the property of Americans there. He blamed many 
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of the rumors of brutal incidents along the borders as attempts by these 
people to force American intervention in Mexico. In reply to these rumors 
he tried to point out their dangers and his position on these attempts to 
bring about intervention by saying: 
This object cannot be obtained as long as sane and honor¬ 
able men are in control of this Government, but very serious 
conditions may be created, unnecessary bloodshed may result, 
and the relations between the two republics may be much em¬ 
barrassed.! 
The more that Wilson attempted to allay any suspicion as to the intent 
of American troops in Mexico, the more stubbornly Carranza attempted to ob¬ 
struct the progress of the expedition in an effort to force its withdrawal. 
He denied American troops the use of railroads to obtain supplies even though 
the United States had granted him the use of American railroads for this 
purpose. The American special representative received instructions to make a 
protest to Carranza of this denial on the ground that depriving the United 
States of this privilege would impede American progress in capturing Villa 
2 
and would make it necessary for American troops to remain in Mexico longer. 
The crisis over sending troops into Mexico became somewhat acute on May 31 
when Arredondo delivered an insulting note from Carranza accusing the United 
States of bad motives and demanding the immediate withdrawal of American troops 
fe ' v • v. ■*--- • ’ *• v?’ 
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from his country. Acting Secretary Polk called the note aggressive and re¬ 
criminatory in tone and style and expressed the opinion that it was bound to 
create irritation in America.^ 
» 
^Ibid., p. I3I. 
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The Carranza note of May 31 caused the United States to adopt a firmer 
course of action toward Mexico. The State Department replied to the note by 
stating in no uncertain terms that the Pershing expedition had been the re¬ 
sult of an indifferent and inefficient Mexican Government that had made no 
tangible effort to apprehend the bandits who had committed atrocities on 
American lives and property. The reply continued by saying that in many 
instances the outlaw bandits had received the protection, as well as the 
encouragement, of the Mexican government. American invasion of Mexico with¬ 
out Carranza's consent was justified on the ground that subsequent events 
had proven that agreement with him was impossible because of his desire not 
to have the American troops in Mexico and that it was he who had cut off all 
negotiations for an agreement along the one of 1882-1896 for restoring peace¬ 
ful conditions along the borders.^" Secretary Lansing informed the de facto 
government that because of Mexico's indifference and failure to capture and 
punish the outlaws the United States would not respect its request for the 
withdrawal of American troops. In refusing this request Lansing said: 
The United States has not sought the duty which has been 
forced upon it of pursuing bandits who under fundamental prin¬ 
ciples of municipal and international law, ought to be pursued 
and arrested and punished by Mexican authorities. Whenever Mexi¬ 
co will assume and effectively exercise that responsibility the 
United States, as it has many times before publicly declared, 
will be glad to have this obligation fulfilled by the de facto 
Government of Mexico.2 
Lansing replied to Carranza's threat to use force to repel the American 
troops by warning him that if he chose such course, the United States Govern¬ 
ment would be derelict in its duty if it did not make clear to him that such 
1Ibid., pp. 581T586. 
^Ibid., p. 395* 
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course would lead to the gravest consequences. The United States, Lansing 
said, would deeply regret such a result, but could not recede from its de¬ 
termination to protect its national rights and could not turn from its duty 
1 
to prevent further invasions of the territory of the United States. 
Even before Secretary Lansing emphatically denied the withdrawal of the 
American troops, American public opinion was in fevor of keeping troops in 
✓ 
Mexico until Villa was caught. The New Republic expressed the opinion of 
many by stating that the mere dispersal of the band res not enough, but that 
Villa must be captured in order to prevent him from re-assembling his band 
and doing the same thing again. It was also felt by many Americans that 
withdrawal would make it appear that Carranza’s threats had frightened the 
United States and would enhance his power at the expense of American influence 
2 
and prestige. 
Before the note of May 31 demands for armed intervention in Mexico arose 
from many quarters. Even members of the President’s cabinet suggest inter¬ 
vention. Mien Tumulty, after a discussion with cabinet members urged the Presi¬ 
dent to take action, Wilson replied by saying: 
I know how deeply you feel about this Columbus affair. Of 
course, it is tragical and deeply regretable from every stand¬ 
point, but in the last analysis I, not the cabinet or you, must 
bear the responsibility for every action that is taken. I have 
to sleep with ny conscience in these matters and I shall be held 
responsible for every drop of blood that may be spent in the enter¬ 
prise of intervention.3 
Wilson did not intend to let the borders troubles force him into inter¬ 
vention in Mexico because he believed that these had been the result of German 
1Ibid. 
2April 15, 1916, pp. 276-277. 
^Tumulty, op. cit.» p. 157. 
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propaganda aimed at provoking a crisis that would involve the United States 
in a wer with Mexico and thus prevent the United States from interfering with 
the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. It had become clear to 
Wilson that war with Germany was inevitable and "that because of this he could 
not risk war with Mexico by yielding to the demands for intervention. War with 
Mexico must be avoided because America would need all of its energy and re¬ 
sources for the impending war with Germany 
Wilson's true attitude toward Mexico was shown by his refusal to use the 
Pershing Expedition for anything other than for the capture of Villa. Here 
he steadily refused to take advantage of a situation that could have easily been 
used for intervention. Even though the punitive expedition violated Mexico's 
sovereignty, it did not result in intervention or in any form of American im¬ 
perialism over Mexico. In appraising Wilson's policy in this respect Jose 
Vasconcilos says: 
In fact, I believe, this case was the test of Mr. Wilson's 
true attitude toward Mexico, and it is plain that in the 
face of a most difficult situation he did least possible harm.^ 
Wilson's intent not to antagonize Mexico was first shown when he did not im¬ 
mediately order Pershing into Mexico on March 9 but waited until March 15 
to attempt to secure Mexico's permission. While his political enemies called 
this a political move made during an election year,^ it must be properly 
viewed as a sincere and honest effort to avoid any action -that would lead to 
war. 
Carranza's obstinacy in regard to the presence of the American troops 
1Ibid.J p. l£9. 
^Rippy, Mexico, 129. 
^Congressional Record, 6ljth Congress, 2nd Sesstion, p. 2130. 
7h 
continued. Through General Trevino he ordered American troops in Mexico 
not to move east, west or south and stated that if they attemplted to do so, 
a clash would be the inevitable result.^ When informed of this threat, 
2 
Pershing replied by saying : "I take orders only from my country”. On June 
21 Captain Charles T. Boyd, Commander of Troops C and K of the Tenth United 
States Cavalry found it necessary to pass eastward through Carrizal, sixty 
miles south of the United States boundary. General Grancisco Gomez, Com¬ 
mander of the Carranza forces at Carrizal, refused to allow the Americans 
to pass. Believing Gomez did not intend to fight, Captain Boyd ordered his 
3 
company to advance even though he was outnunbered by the Mexicans. As a 
result of the clash two American officers and ten other Americans were 
killed and twenty-four were captured and imprisoned. The Mexican loss was 
forty-six killed and thirty-nine were wounded. 
The Carrizal incident could easily have been the spark that would ignite 
the flames of war between the United States and Mexico. Wilson feared that 
this incident might cause him to lose the control which he had been able to 
exercise over the sentiments of the American people. This incident caused 
him to have doubted his wisdom in not having commanded Pershing to return 
northward after it became apparent that Villa had eluded him.^ In a letter 
of June 27 to Colonel House he stated that as grave as the situation was 
he did not intend, if it were any way possible to prevent it, to intervene 
in Mexico. By intervention he meant the rearranging and controlling of 
^"Passing of the Mexican Crisis", Current History, IV (April, 1916), 83U. 
2Ibid. 
^Ibid. Boyd's company consisted of eighty Negro soldiers, a white scout 
and three white officers. 
^Baker, op. cit.. VI, 76. 
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Mexico's affairs.'1' He did not say that he would not take action, but he 
implied that the action would continué to be for the same purpose of the 
original expedition—the reddress of a particular wrong and not for the 
domination of Mexico. 
Even the President's desire for peace could not stand In the way of his 
taking positive action against a defiant and hostile Mexican government. 
Wilson demanded the release of the prisoners and positively informed the 
de facto government that if the demand was refused, war would be the only 
course left for the United States. In addition Mexican ports were blockaded 
by American ships, all merchandise and munitions were prevented from crossing 
the borders and Americans were warned to leave Mexico. Secretary Lansing 
sought to make the position of the United States clear and to remove any 
Latin American suspicions of the motives of the United States by issuing 
notes to all of the diplomats of Central and South America stating that if 
war should come, it would come not as a desire to interfere in Mexican 
affairs, but would come mainly and solely to protect American territory and 
2 
citizens from further attacks by armed bands of Mexicans. 
Wilson's firm stand, together with military preparations for war, such 
as the joint resolution of June 23 by Congress giving the President the power 
to draft the National Guard into the military service of the United States, 
caused Carranza to release the American prisoners on June 28 and to send them 
over the international bridge at El Paso on June 29. Carranza did not want 
war at this particular time any more than did Wilson. In previous encounters 
^Tbid. 
p 
"Passing of the Mexican Crisis," loc. cit.f pp. 83U-835* 
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Carranza had run the risk of war because he was more than certain that 
Wilson would give in before he would destroy his altruistic and benevolent 
policy toward Mexico. Now Carranza was wise enough to see that Wilson’s 
determination to stay out of war could not continue to be relied upon and 
that he must become less aggressive in his actions. Carranza after re¬ 
leasing the prisoners suggested that the United States and Mexico accept 
the offer of mediation by Spain and several Latin American countries.^ 
The United States refused this offer, but suggested that a joint commission 
composed of three American and three Mexican representatives be given the 
task of arranging a settlement. 
The joint-commission idea was the suggestion of Lansing, but was readily 
accepted by Wilson. This offered a possible way out of a critical situation, 
which could easily wreck the efforts which he had made for more than three 
years to prevent war with Mexico. Acceptance of the suggestion was also 
conditioned by the fact that public sentiment was not in favor of a war with 
Mexico. The many letters, telegrams, and petitions received by the President 
assured him that the majority of the American people did not desire war with 
Mexico. The attacks made on Wilson’s Mexican policy by the Republicans 
during the election of 1916 did not sway the President from holding fast to 
the idea that war with a weak country was heartless and immoral. His re- 
election in November was proof that the masses of the American people accep¬ 
ted his course of action including the joint-commission. 
While he was emphatic in his position to prevent war with Mexico, Wilson 
^"Stuart, op. cit., p. l£9. 
o 
Baker, op. cit., VI, 79. 
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did not hesitate to make it clear that the United States would without 
question defend its borders. He said that the defense of the American borders 
was necessary to protect the sovereignty of the United States, but this 
defense must take into consideration the sovereignty of Mexico.'*' Precau¬ 
tions for the protection of the borders were not relaxed even though the 
joint commission had been created. Wilson's call for 100,000 men was prompt¬ 
ly met and the War Department decided to recruit to full extent and as fast 
as possible the militia. The embargo on food and clothing was lifted, but 
2 
war materials were still withheld. 
The joint-commission met from September .6, 1916 through January 15, 1917» 
From the very beginning there was little chance of success. The aims of the 
two sides were too conflicting for any measure of success or agreement. 
Mexico insisted upon an agreement that would result in the immediate with¬ 
drawal of Pershing's expedition. Once the immediate danger of war was some¬ 
what eased, Carranza again became insistent In his demands for the evacua¬ 
tion of the American troops from Mexico. The United States stubbornly refused 
to accept this demand until conditions along the borders justified it. It 
appeared that some progress had been made when the Mexican representatives 
agreed to an agreement that if conditions in Mexico warranted it, American 
troops would be withdrawn in forty days but reserving for the United States 
the right to send an army into Mexico for the purpose of capturing bandits 
who had invaded American territory and fled back to Mexico.^ Carranza 
■*Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 230-231. 
p “ 
"Passing of the Mexican Crisis," loc. cit., p. 835* 
•^Callahan, op. cit., pp. 569-570. 
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realizing that the danger of war had lessened due to the fact that war 
between the United States and Germany was inevitable refused to accept 
the agreement. In light of the changed conditions it was conceivable 
that Carranza would still hold to the position that the presence of 
American troops on Mexico's territory was an unfriendly act toward Mexico, 
and one which his government could not afford to accept. 
The commission adjourned on January 15 after it became apparent that 
the conflicting views of the two countries could not be made to coincide. 
After the adjournment the American commissioners recommended that their 
government restore diplomatic relations with Mexico. This suggestion, 
together with Consul-General Hanna's wire of January 8 that the withdrawal 
of the American troops from Mexico and the placing of the responsibility 
of maintaining order upon Mexico would produce satisfactory results, caused 
the President in the face of the European situation to accept these sug¬ 
gestions."*' By February 5 all of the American soldiers had been withdrawn, 
but a patrol was still kept along the borders ready to invade Mexico if it 
became necessary to protect the Americans along the borders. The responsi¬ 
bility for maintaining order along the Mexican part of the border was 
placed upon the de facto government, but there was not any more assurance 
that it would assume this responsibility after the withdrawal of the Ameri¬ 
can troops than it had before the Pershing expedition. The Pershing expe¬ 
dition had accomplished nothing, but had nearly wrecked the policy of the 
Wilson administration. When the troops were withdrawn, they left behind 
them "a snarling Carranza, a defiant and unrepentant Villa, and a revolu¬ 
tion that had yet to run its course".^ 
-'-Ibid., p. 571. 
2 
Bailey, op. cit., p. 609. 
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As far as immediate or direct results were concerned, Carranza had 
been the victor in all of his encounters with Wilson. Carranza's position 
had been made possible by the early stand of Wilson who in the beginning 
had looked upon the Mexican leader as a man who had a rare chance of serv¬ 
ing his country by making the principles of the revolution a reality. 
Wilson had hoped to use Carranza as an instrument through which he could 
shape the Mexican revolution into a victory for constitutional government 
and for bringing about the overthrow of an economic and social order which 
exploited the masses for the benefit of the privileged few. Though dis¬ 
appointed with Carranza's refusal to accept the role which he had pre¬ 
conceived for him, Wilson still refused to take any action which would re¬ 
move the Mexican leader from power. Carranza met Wilson's altruism with 
hostility and rebuff. Only fate prevented Carranza, who was really Wilson's 
creation, from wrecking the President's entire Mexican policy. 
From the long range view Wilson was the victor in his relations with 
Carranza. By his firmness in his position not to be driven into a war with 
Mexico, even when rebuffed and embarrassed by a hostile government, he gained 
a reputation as the champion ofpeace. Admirers throughout the world now 
looked upon him as the one man who had proven that nations could settle their 
disputes without resorting to war. The prestige won by him in Mexican 
policy was in a measure responsible for the confidence which the masses of 
the people in war-tom Europe placed in him during the closing years of 
World War I. By refusing to use armed intervention when he realized that 
Carranza was fighting his policy, Wilson proved that he was a staunch be¬ 
liever in the political independence and the territorial integrity of small 
nations as well as great nations. Though he failed in his objective for 
Mexico, his patience and stubbomess won for him a victory of a principle 
80 
that was to be presented as one of his fourteen point's in his program 
for ending World War I. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EVAIUATIDN OF WILSON 'S MEXICAN POLICY 
Wilson's Mexican Policy, like his entire foreign policy, was more 
theoretical than practical and because of this its chances for real suc¬ 
cess were limited from the very beginning. The fundamental principles 
involved in it were too far ahead of the period in which they were at¬ 
tempted. These factors, together with the political and psychological 
heritage of the Mexican people, hampered the realization of his dream. 
As far as achieving his desired goal—the establishment of an orderly 
and constitutional government that would promote the rights and interests 
of the masses—the policy was a failure during the period of this study. 
When the Pershing Expedition was withdrawn and Wilson turned his attention 
from Mexico to the European conflict, Mexico was far from constitutional 
government and the masses had received no appreciable benefits from the 
revolution. Wilson's efforts toward this goal were misunderstood and re¬ 
sented by the people in whose behalf they had been undertaken. Without 
a doubt his stubborn insistence on establishing constitutional government 
prolonged the disorder and confusion in Mexico and resulted in the loss 
of many lives and the destruction of millions of dollars' worth of pro¬ 
perty. Yet an abandonment of this objective for the peace offered by the 
acceptance of the principle of expediency would have been a betrayal of 
his moral principles and his belief that it was the mission of the United 
States to make the world safe for democracy. 
Even though the Wilson policy failed to bring about orderly and con¬ 
stitutional government, it nevertheless benefitted the Mexican people. 
81 
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By refusing to be persuaded by the demands of those who desired inter¬ 
vention for selfish and materialistic reasons, Wilson did not take any 
action that would deprive Mexico of its autonomy and its rightful oppor¬ 
tunity for self development. As a result of the policy pursued by Wilson 
during the critical period, 1913-1917* Mexico was left free to work out 
its own destiny. When the Mexican leaders refused to accept his plan, 
Wilson still held to the belief that the people of Mexico had the right of 
independence and self-determination. He held firmly to the belief that 
if given time and freedom from outside interference, the Mexicans would 
end the chaotic conditions that had resulted from the revolution. One one 
occasion he remarked to Tumulty that "time, the great solvent, will, I am 
sure, vindicate this policy of humanity and forebearance".'1' 
The greatest importance of Wilson's policy was not its influence upon 
Mexican history, but was rather its impact upon inter-American relations. 
The policy proved to be a victory for the Pan-American ideal. Wilson 
entered office at a time when United States-Latin American relations were 
at their lowest ebb due to the hostilities and suspicions created by the 
so-called "Roosevelt Corollary" of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Dollar 
Diplomacy" of the Taft administration. Wilson brought Latin America closer 
to the United States by following in Mexico a policy that repudiated the 
arrogance embodied in the "Roosevelt Corollary" and the selfishness em¬ 
bodied in ."Dollar Diplomacy". The policies of arrogance, selfishness and 
domination were supplanted by a policy based on altruistic and humane 
principles which were in harmony with the Pan-American ideal. The way that 
he handled the Mexican crisis in relation to the Pan-American ideal was the 
^Tumulty, op. cit., p. 198 
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beginning of the hemispheric solidarity that was to reach its maturity 
during the administration of the next Democratic President, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. 
Wilson's Mexican Policy embraced the "first concrete move in the 
direction of collective responsibility if a breakdown of constitutional 
government in any part of the Americas should endanger the security of 
the other republics".'1' The acceptance of the mediation offer of the 
ABC powers during the crisis precipitated by the Vera Cruz occupation 
was the beginning of a change in the attitude of the United States as 
to its role in the Western Hemisphere. It was a recognition that the main¬ 
tenance of peace in this hemisphere was the bilateral responsibility of 
all of the American republics and not the unilateral responsibility of the 
United States. This gesture was also a repudiation of the international 
police role embodied in the "Roosevelt Corollary". 
The Wilson policy in Mexico was an attempt, and to a degree a success¬ 
ful attempt to give practical evidence to his belief that the Pan-American 
ideal was "the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law 
and independence and liberty and mutual service 
Wilson's Mexican Policy had international, as well as, Pan-American 
significance. The situation in Mexico had been a testing ground for some 
of the principles contained in the fourteen points that President Wilson 
was to offer as the basis of settlement of the European crisis. His tenacity 
and sincerity in demanding for the Mexicans the right of self-determination, 
political independence and territorial integrity helped to win for him the 
^Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 191U*)> p. 186. 
^Baker and Dodd, op. cit., II, 1*09. 
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moral leadership of the world at a time when it needed such a leader. 
The sincerity that he had exhibited in demanding these principles for the 
Mexicans caused the people in war-tom Europe to look upon him as a sym¬ 
bol of a just and lasting peace. 
Wilson's prophesey that time would vindicate his policy of "humanity 
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